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Abstract
While instruments to price congestion exist since the 1970s, less than a dozen cities around 
the world have a cordon or zone pricing scheme. Geneva, Switzerland, may be soon join-
ing them. This paper builds on a detailed review of the existing schemes to identify a set 
of plausible design options for the Geneva congestion charge. In turn, it analyzes their 
acceptability, leveraging a large survey of residents of both Geneva and the surrounding 
areas of Switzerland and France. Our original approach combines a discrete choice experi-
ment with randomized informational treatments. We consider an extensive set of attributes, 
such as perimeter, price and price modulation, use of revenues, and exemption levels and 
beneficiaries. The informational treatments address potential biased beliefs concerning the 
charge’s expected effects on congestion and pollution. We find that public support depends 
crucially on the policy design. We identify an important demand for exemptions, which, 
albeit frequently used in the design of environmental taxation, is underexplored in the 
analysis of public support. This demand for exemptions is not motivated by efficiency rea-
sons. It comes mostly by local residents, for local residents. Further, people show a marked 
preference for constant prices, even if efficiency would point to dynamic pricing based on 
external costs. Hence, we highlight a clear trade-off between efficiency and acceptability. 
However, we also show, causally, that this gap can in part be closed, with information pro-
vision. Analyzing heterogeneity, we show that preferences vary substantially with where 
people live and how they commute. Even so, we identify several designs that reach major-
ity support.
Keywords Acceptability · Congestion charge · Policy design · Public support · Road 
pricing
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1 Introduction
Traffic congestion is among the top issues in many cities in the world. Congestion gener-
ates important costs to society, due to extended journeys, local and global pollution, noise, 
and accidents. Over the next few decades, projections predict a large increase in urban 
population, in both developed and developing countries (United Nations 2015), potentially 
increasing total motorized mobility by about 40% by 2030 with respect to 2015, and by 
over 90% by 2050 (OECD/ITF 2017). However, the extent to which an increasing urban 
population translates into higher traffic congestion depends on public policy. Interest in 
curbing traffic congestion and reducing local air pollution has likely increased following 
the recent COVID-19 lockdowns, which made very salient the contribution of motorized 
traffic to air pollution and other exernal costs (Berman and Ebisu 2020; Cicala et al. 2020; 
He et al. 2020; Muhammad et al. 2020). Congestion is one of the classic textbook examples 
of an externality, whose economic theory dates back to Pigou (1920). Time lost in traffic 
is the main externality from traffic congestion (Small et al. 2005, Table 3.3; Small et al. 
2007), followed by car accidents and pollution among others (e.g. Li et al. 2012; Jacobsen 
2013). The solution to the external costs of driving is well known since the 1960s: pricing 
road traffic (Walters 1961; Reynolds 1963; Vickrey 1963). However, very few jurisdictions 
in the world have implemented congestion charges. Unlike the climate externality, traffic 
congestion is a very local issue, and intergenerational equity issues are largely absent. Yet, 
there are only a handful of cities in the world with a cordon or zone pricing scheme, com-
pared to some 60 jurisdictions pricing carbon (World Bank 2020). Hence, the 1963 state-
ment by William S. Vickrey, that “in no other major area are pricing practices so irrational, 
so out of date, and so conducive to waste as in urban transportation” is even more relevant 
today than it was in the 60s (Vickrey 1963, p. 452).
The main reason for the extremely slow emergence of congestion charges in world cities 
is arguably lack of public support (Gu et al. 2018). Policymakers in many cities, including 
New York, have in the past abandoned their plans for a congestion charge due to lack of 
public support. A congestion charge was rejected at the ballot box in Birmingham, Edin-
burgh, and Manchester. Voters in Gothenburg rejected it in a referendum, although the 
scheme was nevertheless implemented given the non-binding character of the referendum. 
Voters in Stockholm approved it, but only after a trial period.
Standard political economy theory shows that even policies that are clearly beneficial 
for society may not actually be implemented, mainly because of the mismatch between 
policymakers’ incentive to be reelected and society’s welfare (e.g. Dixit et al. 1997; Samu-
elson and Zeckhauser 1988; Hahn 1989; Maskin and Tirole 2004). However, reforms may 
not only create discontent among losers, but potentially also among winners, if the latter 
do not correctly anticipate, ex ante, the benefits of the policy change (Kallbekken et  al. 
2011; Dal Bó et al. 2018). Winners may also have preferences towards fairness, related to 
both the polluter-pay principle and distributional effects. Equity issues may thus be in con-
flict with efficient congestion charge designs (see Kristoffersson et al. 2017), which implies 
that the more efficient designs proposed in economic theory could be less accepted by the 
population.
The federal government of Switzerland recently encouraged cantons to consider mobil-
ity pricing, a dynamic pricing approach to mobility that includes the use of congestion 
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charges, to tackle congestion on roads as well as other transportation modes. Despite the 
high levels of congestion in Swiss cities, not many cantons stepped forward. In a country 
where public ballots take place about 4 times a year on multiple issues, the political stakes 
are very high. The Canton of Geneva, however, did so, launching a policy process aimed 
at identifying the best congestion charge design for the city of Geneva. Geneva is the most 
congested city in Switzerland, with about 2,000,000 trips per day in the agglomeration in 
2010, at an average speed of about 20 km per hour in the city center (DETA 2014). Geneva 
has struggled for years to find solutions to its ever increasing traffic.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it builds on the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on congestion charges to identify a set of plausible designs that could fit the con-
text of Geneva. Second, it tackles the issue of public support related to the implementation 
of environmental policy instruments. It uses a large survey of respondents in both the Can-
ton of Geneva and the neighboring regions of Switzerland and France to assess public sup-
port for the policy designs identified in this study. It relies on a discrete choice experiment 
to estimate preferences for the following parameters: charge rate, perimeter of the charge, 
modulation of the charge, level of exemptions, beneficiaries of exemptions (if any), and use 
of revenues. Given the large sample, and its cross-national feature, heterogeneity across 
respondents is analyzed in detail. Public support may also depend on the information avail-
able to respondents. A stylized fact, discussed in detail in the following sections, is that 
very salient environmental policies tend to be more popular ex post than ex ante. This find-
ing may rationalize the fact that, in some contexts, congestion charges might have been 
implemented without majority support, while never being repealed (De Borger and Proost 
2012). Specifically, people may revise their beliefs while experiencing their effectiveness 
(Cherry et al. 2014; Janusch et al. 2020). The acceptability of congestion charges increased 
after their implementation in Stockholm (Winslott-Hiselius et al. 2009; Eliasson 2014) and 
in London (Schade and Baum 2007). However, implementing a congestion charge, even 
if only for a trial period, implies considerable sunk costs and requires important political 
capital. Hence, providing more information to the general public, ex ante, may represent 
an effective alternative to trialing in increasing public support (see Carattini et  al. 2017, 
2019). In this paper, we go a step forward and explicitly test this hypothesis in a stated 
preference context, by coupling the discrete choice experiment with a split sample design 
introducing two randomized informational treatments, and a control group.
Our results show that public support depends closely on the design as well as the infor-
mation provided, in particular with respect to the environmental benefits of a congestion 
charge. Public support decreases (increases) considerably with the charge rate (exemp-
tions). However, the provision of information, especially on indirect benefits that may not 
be immediately factored in voters’ opinions, such as improved air quality, can increase pub-
lic support and make more ambitious policies politically palatable. Providing information 
seems a relatively inexpensive strategy that could allow policymakers to push more strin-
gent policies past the majority threshold. However, even so, concessions from the ideal of 
efficiency may be necessary. For instance, public support is stronger for exemptions to resi-
dents, rather than motorbikes or alternative fuel vehicles. Also, while on efficiency grounds 
congestion charging should match as closely as possible the marginal damage of driving, 
people tend to have a strong preference for a constant, predictable modulation. Similarly, 
most people demand earmarking for improvements in public transportation rather than a 
revenue-neutral approach. Finally, we identify substantial heterogeneity in our sample. 
Preferences for either a more compact perimeter or an extended area depend on where 
people live and how they commute. The same applies to spending, and exemptions. That 
is, public support can vary considerably depending on who has the right to say over the 
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implementation of a congestion charge, in particular between residents of the charged area 
and people in the suburban areas around it.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature 
on congestion charges, and road pricing more in general. Second, it contributes to the lit-
erature on public support for environmental policy. In this respect, the contribution is two-
fold. First, it provides evidence on people’s preferences for different design parameters and 
on their role for public support in a context wherein a congestion charge is an option under 
serious consideration. Its design also allows assessing the role of exemptions, whose effect 
on public support has been underexamined despite exemptions having been widely used 
not only for congestion charges but for environmental taxes at large, including carbon taxes 
(see World Bank 2020). Second, it provides a methodological contribution. It tackles the 
issue of information asymmetries with randomized informational treatments in combina-
tion with a discrete choice experiment. It shows, more in general, that hypotheses on the 
role of information on public support can be tested directly, with the simple use of rand-
omized treatments.
The remainder of the paper is given as follows. Section 2 provides background informa-
tion about congestion charges and institutional knowledge about the local context of this 
study. Section 3 describes the survey design and data. Section 4 provides the main empiri-
cal findings. Section 5 concludes.
2  Background
2.1  The External Costs of Driving
In the spirit of Pigou (1920), Vickrey (1963) suggested the implementation of pricing sys-
tems attributing to drivers the social cost of their driving, inclusive of the cost borne by the 
other commuters. Given the traffic externality, Pigouvian pricing should be introduced to 
make drivers pay for the (high) marginal cost of their use of street space. Vickrey’s analysis 
pointed to large welfare gains from road pricing, derived in particular by the change in traf-
fic during peak hours, when the extra cost of an additional car is the highest, as the infra-
structure capacity is pushed to the limit and the speed of other drivers is affected. Welfare 
gains of different road pricing designs have been estimated by several studies, including 
Walters (1961), Arnott et al. (1993), Parry (2002), and Yang et al. (2020).
Congestion may not be the only externality of driving. An emerging literature has 
recently developed, linking traffic, pollution, and health (see Currie et  al. 2014 for a 
review). Following the implementation of electronic tolls in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 
Currie and Walker (2011) find a decrease in nitrogen dioxide  (NO2) and in the probability 
of prematurity and low-weight births by about 10% in the areas surrounding the tolls. Knit-
tel et al. (2016) show with data for California that a standard deviation increase in traffic 
around a given area is related with a 0.2% standard deviation increase in mortality. Higher 
pollution levels are also related to higher infant mortality. Simeonova et  al. (2018) find 
an immediate reduction in asthma among young children after the Stockholm congestion 
charge was initially trialed, but a much larger effect once it became permanent, pointing to 
the non-linear effects of exposure to pollution on health.
Recent work extends the analysis of the impacts of air pollution from traffic to adults. 
For instance, Zhong et al. (2017) show that in periods with higher traffic, emergency room 
visits in Beijing for fever and heart-related symptoms become substantially more frequent. 
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Other health impacts related to air pollution include depressive symptoms (Zhang et  al. 
2017) and lower cognitive skills, in both the short and long run, such as productivity losses 
leading to lower test scores (Lavy et al. 2014) and lower lifetime earnings (Bharadwaj et al. 
2017). The recent COVID-19 pandemic adds to this list. Contemporaneous exposure to 
fine particulate matter from various sources, including traffic, has been shown to have a 
substantial detrimental effect on COVID-19 morbidity and mortality (Austin et al. 2020).
Additionally, congestion charges may also have an effect on accidents, but this effect is 
a priori ambiguous. Lower congestion may decrease the risk of collision between cars and 
other road users, but may also imply higher speed and thus a higher likelihood of severe 
accidents (Shefer and Rietveld 1997). Cyclists and pedestrians are the most vulnerable road 
users, and their number tends to increase if people are incentivized not to use cars (Wang 
et al. 2009; Li et al. 2012). Also, congestion charges can potentially divert traffic to other, 
unpriced areas (Parry and Bento 2002). Green et al. (2016) conclude for the London con-
gestion charge that its net effects on accidents and severe accidents are such that the con-
gestion charge is beneficial.
2.2  Existing Congestion Charges
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of all cordon and zone pricing schemes currently in 
function. We are aware that other schemes to tackle traffic congestion directly or indirectly 
exists, such as tolled roads and bridges (e.g. Currie and Walker 2011), toll lanes (e.g. Bento 
et  al. 2020) or smart-parking programs (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Ngo 2020). These road 
pricing options are related to our study, but do not inform directly its design.
The first congestion charge scheme was implemented in the central business district 
of Singapore in 1975. As a result, traffic entering the zone (circulating within the zone) 
decreased by 25% (45%) and travel speed doubled in the morning peaks (Khan 2001; Goh 
2002). In 1990, the coverage was expanded to include a number of expressways. In 1998, 
the manual road pricing system was replaced, and Singapore became the first city to intro-
duce electronic tolls. Thanks to the electronic system, drivers can be charged according to 
their vehicle type and their travel speed, which is used as a proxy for congestion.
After Singapore, several urban toll rings were implemented in Norway; in Bergen in 
1986, in Oslo in 1990, in Trondheim in 1991, in Kristiansand in 1997, and in Stavanger in 
2001. The toll rings of Bergen and Oslo were then converted to congestion charges in 2016 
and 2017, respectively. The main objective of the Norwegian toll rings was originally to 
finance road infrastructures, rather than reduce congestion (Ramjerdi et  al. 2004). Since 
2003, however, only 45% of the revenues generated by the congestion charge of Bergen 
are still used to finance road constructions, while the rest is used to improve environmental 
quality and road safety. Users have to pay each time they enter the city center, but not when 
they exit. Users may also benefit from some discounts if they buy monthly, biannual or 
annual permits, which affect the marginal cost of commuting.
In 2003, London implemented a congestion charge of £5 per vehicle per day for either 
entering, or circulating within central London (Leape 2006). The rate has been revised 
upward several times and is currently at £15. As in other cities, exemptions include bicy-
cles, motorcycles, taxis, people with disabilities, and buses. Residents pay only 10% of the 
charge when crossing or traveling within the London congestion charge zone. Revenues are 
used to fund public transportation (about 80%), road safety (11%), and cycling and walking 
projects (9%). The main objective of the London congestion charge was to reduce traffic 
and congestion. The drop in traffic between 2002 and 2003 has been estimated at about 
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30%, exceeding expectations. Transport for London estimated that most of the decrease 
was due to a switch to public transportation, and a small fraction related to the use of bicy-
cles or taxis. However, about 25% of drivers had adapted their journey, avoiding the con-
gestion charge, and up to 10% may be now traveling outside of charged areas. Average 
travel speeds also increased in central London, from 8.9 miles per hour to 10.4 miles per 
hour, based on a simple before-after comparison for 2003 (Leape 2006).
In Sweden, Stockholm implemented a congestion charge in 2007 after a trial period 
and a referendum, accepted by 53% of the city’s voters (Eliasson et  al. 2009). Gothen-
burg followed in 2013, after a non-binding referendum, in which the congestion charge was 
rejected by 56% of voters, but nevertheless implemented. An important debate on the use 
of revenues, which were supposed to finance a rather unpopular rail tunnel under the city, 
might have contributed to its rejection (Börjesson and Kristoffersson 2015; Andersson and 
Nässén 2016). In both Gothenburg and Stockholm, road users have to pay to enter as well 
as to exit the city center. In contrast to other cities, taxis are not exempted in Stockholm, 
albeit they represent around 8% of the cordon passages. In Stockholm, following the imple-
mentation of the congestion charge, traffic volume decreased by about 20% and kilometers 
driven in the inner city by about 15% (Eliasson et al. 2009; Börjesson et al. 2012; Croci 
2016). Travel times decreased between one third and one half during the peak periods and 
a 4.5% increase in the number of passengers by public transit is attributed to the road toll.
In 2008, Milan implemented a road pricing scheme, called Ecopass, to curb pollution. 
Ecopass was a cordon pricing scheme, charging a daily fee for entering the cordoned zone 
depending on the vehicle’s emissions of  PM10 (Croci and Douvan 2015). Registered resi-
dents of the cordoned area received a 60% discount. In 2011, a majority of voters (79%) 
supported the extension of the road pricing scheme with a congestion charge called Area 
C. After a trial period, Area C became permanent in 2013. With the new scheme, highly 
polluting vehicles are outright banned from the city center, whereas all other vehicles pay 
a daily charge of €5. As its predecessor, Area C also includes a system of privileges for 
residents, who receive the right to cross the cordon 40 times a year for free, and then face a 
reduced charge of €2. Milan’s scheme also exempts alternative fuel vehicles, among others. 
Percoco (2013) provides an initial assessment of Area C, showing a decrease in charged 
vehicles of about 56% and an increase in the purchase of alternative fuel vehicles of about 
5%. During a suspension of the scheme due to a court ruling, Gibson and Carnovale (2015) 
find that traffic in the cordoned area increased by up to 20%, while it decreased right before 
and right after Area C’s standard charging hours (by about 23%), and on the roads sur-
rounding the cordoned area (by about 18%). While the charge was inactive, CO and  PM10 
emissions increased by 6% to 17% inside and outside Area C, respectively.
2.3  Public Support
Public support is, in several contexts, the main obstacle to the implementation of environ-
mental pricing. A rapidly growing literature has emerged to address this issue, and a few 
stylized facts have emerged (cf. Carattini et al. 2018b for a review).
First, public support tends to decline as the level of stringency, measured by the tax rate, 
increases. Choice-experiment surveys are particularly suited to detect this phenomenon 
(e.g. Sælen and Kallbekken 2011; Brännlund and Persson 2012; Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 
2015; Carattini et al. 2017).
Second, people may have a tendency to overestimate the downsides of a policy change, 
and underestimate the upsides, in particular the incentive effect of environmental taxes and 
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their ability to change behavior (e.g. Dresner et al. 2006; Steg et al. 2006; Baranzini and 
Carattini 2017; Carattini et al. 2017).
Third, it follows from the previous point that public support may increase after a policy 
is implemented and people experience it. This stylized fact follows from two types of stud-
ies. First, lab studies, in which trial periods are manipulated by the experimenters. Cherry 
et  al. (2014) is the first study to exogenously allocate trial periods across experimental 
groups before a vote on a Pigouvian tax. Janusch et al. (2020) expand on this approach by 
looking specifically at a congestion game, in which players have heterogeneous time pref-
erences and can vote on a congestion charge, before, during, or after a trial, which allows 
isolating the effect of learning via different trial durations on public support. Janusch et al. 
(2020) also randomize information provision, which in their context focuses on the costs 
of the congestion charge. Second, observational studies, comparing public support across 
control and treatment groups before and after the plausibly exogenous introduction of a 
Pigouvian tax. Carattini et al. (2018a) leverage the decision of the Supreme Court of Swit-
zerland to impose the implementation of pricing garbage by the bag in a Swiss canton, part 
of which already uses this instrument. Pricing garbage by the bag substantially reduces 
residential waste with little unintended effects and this leads many voters to reconsider 
the policy. No change in perceptions is observed in the control group, which had already 
experienced the policy. This study confirms the findings of previous studies on congestion 
charges relying on simple before-after comparisons. In particular, Schuitema et al. (2010) 
and Hansla et al. (2017) study, respectively, the abovementioned referenda of Stockholm, 
and Gothenburg, which both followed a trial period, and show higher public support after 
the trial runs. Several other studies show that preferences and attitudes towards road pric-
ing improve over time. For instance, after a single year of implementation, the fraction of 
surveyed people opposing the tolls decreased from 54% to 34% in Bergen, from 70% to 
64% in Oslo, and from 72% to 48% in Trondheim (Odeck and Bråthen 2002). These find-
ings are consistent with Winslott-Hiselius et al. (2009), who argue that a trial period con-
tributes to making the benefits of a congestion charge salient to voters (see also Gu et al. 
2018 for a review of the literature with specific focus on congestion charges).
Fourth, people tend to have a preference for earmarking the generated revenues for envi-
ronmental purposes. Many people do not expect environmental taxes to change behavior, 
and thus do not expect any effect on the environment unless revenues are earmarked for 
environmental purposes. The review of road pricing schemes by Jaensirisak et al. (2005) 
suggests that ex-post acceptability is higher for schemes (19 in total) that earmark revenues 
for environmental purposes (an average of 55% of support) than for schemes (32 in total) in 
which revenues are not earmarked (35% of support). Earmarking guarantees that the tax is 
not implemented for fiscal purposes. Revenue redistribution, for instance by reducing exist-
ing, distortionary taxes, may also be seen with suspicion. People may not see the rationale 
for taxing here and redistributing there, especially when redistribution takes place in an 
area unrelated to environmental policy. Sælen and Kallbekken (2011) refer to this phenom-
enon as issue-linkage. In our context, since people may believe that drivers are inelastic to 
road charges (Ubbels and Verhoef 2006), they may then have a preference for earmarked 
revenues for public transportation. People may also like to vote on explicit policy packages, 
charging road transportation on one hand, and expanding public transportation in the other, 
as for instance in Stockholm (cf. Kottenhoff and Brundell Freij 2009).
Public support is most likely the main obstacle to the implementation of congestion 
charges (see again Gu et  al. 2018 for a review). While in Sweden referenda on conges-
tion charges were organized under the pressure of the central government, in several other 
contexts policymakers backed away at an earlier stage, as in Cambridge, Hong Kong (Ison 
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and Rye 2005), and New York City. In New York City, people perceived a scheme charg-
ing traffic in Manhattan as particularly unfair, especially for people living in the outer bor-
oughs. Also, proposed exemptions to taxi drivers, a significant contributor to New York 
City’s traffic, were a source of public opposition (Schaller 2010). New York City has more 
recently tried again to implement a congestion charge, with a slightly revised design com-
pared to the earlier attempts. The charge was initially expected to be introduced in 2021 
with revenues earmarked for public transit. However, the congestion charge is, at the time 
of writing, still pending approval from the federal government. In Manchester and Edin-
burgh, public ballots were organized and the congestion charges rejected by 79% and 75% 
of voters, respectively (Hensher and Li 2013). The double cordon scheme proposed in 
both cities was perceived as too complicated by the general public. In the case of Edin-
burgh, a survey shows that only 47.8% of the respondents knew the charge level that would 
have been implemented and only 37.4% believed that the scheme could reduce congestion 
(Allen et al. 2006). While in Gothenburg the referendum was non-binding, in Manchester 
and Edinburgh the project of a congestion charge was abandoned after the rejection on the 
ballot.
2.4  The Geneva Congestion Charge
2.4.1  Rationale
About 75% of the Swiss population (8.4 million in 2016) lives in urban agglomerations, 
which cover about one quarter of the territory and provide 70% of the jobs (ARE 2018). 
Population density is thus relatively high, with most people being concentrated around 
major cities, connected by an intense network of roads and railways. If rail represented 
more than half of the passenger traffic in 1950 (40% for roads), in 2015 only 15% of the 
trips across Switzerland were undertaken by train (75% for roads, see Litra 2017). In abso-
lute terms, road traffic volumes increased 15 times from 1950 to 2015, whereas train traffic 
3 times only. Many city centers are located near the border with Germany, France, Italy, 
and Austria. About 2.2 million people cross the Swiss border every day, 96% of them by 
car (OFS 2017). As a result, the road network is often congested, especially around urban 
agglomerations. The direct cost of traffic jams are estimated to exceed one billion CHF a 
year (Keller and Wüthrich 2016), while the external costs from accidents and environmen-
tal pollution from driving at about CHF 8 billions a year (ARE 2016).1
According to the Swiss Constitution, public roads should be free of tolls. The road 
infrastructure is currently mainly funded by specific taxes, such as fuel tax and a high-
way sticker. The latter was introduced in 1994, after a public ballot. Since then, holding 
a vignette is compulsory for driving on highways. Ten years later, voters accepted an 
increase from CHF 30 to CHF 40 a year in the price of the vignette. A further increase to 
CHF 100 was, however, rejected in 2013 by 60% of the voters. Public ballots take place 3 
to 4 times a year in Switzerland, with people voting in each occasion on about 3-4 subjects 
of national or local politics. While public support has been instrumental for the implemen-
tation of congestion charges in virtually all contexts where it exists, acceptance by voters is 
all the more necessary in Switzerland.
1 1CHF ≈ 1USD at the time of the study.
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Until recently, mobility pricing in general, and congestion charges in particular, were 
only a theoretical concept in Switzerland. However, given the high level of traffic conges-
tion, the Swiss government introduced mobility pricing to the policy agenda, and invited 
cantons and cities to step forward. Geneva was among the candidates for a congestion 
charge pilot program. According to the latest release of the TomTom Traffic Index, which 
ranks some 400 cities by their congestion levels using data from location devices, Geneva 
is a heavily congested city in which the average commuter loses about 146 hours per year 
due to traffic congestion, especially during weekdays (about 60% of extra time in the morn-
ing peak and about 70% of extra time in the evening peak). With more than 2 millions 
trips per day in the agglomeration of Geneva, of which more than half a million are under-
taken in the city center, the cost of congestion is very large. A similar pattern emerges from 
INRIX’s Global Traffic Scorecard 2019, another ranking of almost 1,000 cities based on 
pollution levels.2
There are several reasons for this particular situation. First, similarly to many European 
cities, the city center was built before the advent of the automobile. Second, Geneva has a 
small territory with relatively high density, leading to a tight housing market (Drechsel and 
Funk 2017). As a result, the urban area is expanding into the neighboring areas of France, 
increasing the pressure on road infrastructures.
Geneva also suffers from an important air pollution problem. According to recent 
administrative data, the total external costs of  PM10 and  NOx on health, life quality, build-
ings, forests, and agriculture reach almost CHF 120 millions a year (Baranzini et al. 2017). 
Furthermore, the concentration of most pollutants is higher in the city center than in the 
suburban areas. Concentrations of  NOx and  PM10 per  km2 are almost four times higher in 
the smaller perimeter than in the rest of the canton.
According to a recent survey on the quality of life in Geneva and surroundings, includ-
ing the adjacent areas of France, 45% of respondents consider traffic the top policy prior-
ity in the region, up from 34% in 2016 (Baranzini et al. 2018b). It does not surprise, then, 
that the Canton of Geneva is willing to run a pilot scheme with a local congestion charge. 
Geneva tried several options to tackle congestion in the past, but many faced strong politi-
cal resistance. Only recently, a project to build either a tunnel under, or a bridge over, the 
lake of Geneva to connect the right and left banks, which dates back to 1896, was accepted 
in a public ballot. In 2016, 68% of the population also accepted a policy package address-
ing mobility issues, including additional pedestrian areas, and bike lanes, as well as low 
emission zones. While this positive outcome is a strong signal that the local population is 
supportive of major changes in mobility, important concerns remain for policymakers on 
the potential acceptability of a congestion charge.
2.4.2  Design
Following a decision by the local parliament, a task force was instituted to study different 
options for a potential congestion charge. This study is part of these efforts. In what fol-
lows, we consider a set of possible suitable designs for the context of Geneva. We test their 
acceptability by the general public in Geneva and the neighboring areas. Based on the local 
context, and lessons from existing schemes, we consider the following dimensions: charge 
2 See https:// www. tomtom. com/ (last accessed on July 10, 2020) and https:// inrix. com/ score card (last 
accessed on July 10, 2020).
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rate, perimeter of the charge, modulation of the charge, level of exemptions, beneficiaries 
of exemptions, and use of revenues. Figure 1 illustrates the two options for the perimeter, 
which are given by the political process and the local topography. Being surrounded by 
France, it is legally difficult to conceive a perimeter either in France or right at the border. 
The perimeters that we consider include all the areas with very high levels of congestion in 
the region (“hotspots” identified by TomTom) and were validated by policymakers. First, 
a perimeter mainly overlapping the Geneva highway ring, which encircles most urban and 
suburban areas. Driving on the highway to bypass the city of Geneva would remain free 
of charge. Second, a perimeter around the urban center, where walking, cycling, and pub-
lic transportation are already credible alternatives to driving, but motorized traffic remains 
important. Every day, more than 600,000 trips entering, leaving or crossing this area are 
undertaken. According to internal simulations by the local government, the number of trips 
to the urban center could be dramatically decreased with a congestion charge. For instance, 
implementing around the urban center a congestion charge set at CHF 1, with a CHF 1.50 
top-up at peak hours and a 50% exemption to residents, could potentially lead to a reduc-
tion in traffic of about 50%. In either case, the congestion charge would use cordon pricing. 
With this design, users would be charged only when crossing the cordon, not for internal 
rides. We, however, also consider a distance-based charge in our survey.
In terms of pricing, we consider a CHF 0.20 - 5 range, to be paid, as in Stockholm, for 
both entering and leaving the zone in order to reduce both morning and evening congestion 
peaks. In Geneva, almost one fourth of the traffic takes place in the morning and evening 
peaks. We consider CHF 5 (CHF 10 for a two-way trip) as the upper bound of a politically 
Fig. 1  The two perimeters of the congestion charge: the highway ring (blue) and the urban center (red)
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plausible charge. We assume the congestion charge to be in force from Monday to Friday, 
with the exception of public holidays, from 6 am to 7.30 pm, the interval of time when 
congestion is the highest. For simplicity, we do not consider alternative timing options in 
this study.
However, we do consider five different modulation options, either on top or instead of 
the standard charge. First, we consider a top-up charge of CHF 1 during periods of high 
pollution, in response to variation in pollution levels (Coria et al. 2015), with the magni-
tude of the top-up charge being based on recent studies on the external cost of road traffic 
in terms of air pollution in Switzerland (Ecoplan/Infras 2018). Second, we consider a top-
up charge of CHF 1.50 between 6.30 am and 9 am and between 4 pm and 7 pm, when con-
gestion is at its peak (peak hours). The top-up charge is computed to reflect average time 
lost in traffic and the median wage in the local market. Third, we consider a top-up charge 
of CHF 0.20 for each kilometer driven inside the perimeter. With this option, we come 
close to the textbook ideal of pricing according to marginal damage, although, for ensur-
ing comparability in the survey part of this study, we consider marginal pricing on top of 
the fixed charge of crossing the cordon. CHF 0.20 follows from the literature, which esti-
mates the social cost of congestion in our and similar contexts (Maibach et al. 2007; Eco-
plan/Infras 2014). Fourth, we consider a scheme in which the standard charge applies, but 
only during peak hours. During off-peak hours, crossing the cordon is free. Everything else 
equal, this modulation produces the lowest cost for drivers. Fifth, we consider a reference 
scenario wherein pricing is constant during the day, i.e. there is neither a top-up charge 
nor an uncharged period. For simplicity, we refrained from including real-time pricing, as 
implemented in Singapore, among the modulation options of this study.
In the existing road pricing schemes, subgroups of users are often totally or partially 
exempted. Some exemptions can be rationalized on efficiency grounds, others are imple-
mented to increase perceived fairness and acceptability. In our study, exemptions can go 
from 0% (no exemption) to 100% (total exemption). Building on the existing schemes, we 
consider the following groups as potential beneficiaries of a partial or total exemption: peo-
ple living within the cordoned area (residents); motorized two-wheel vehicles (e.g. motor-
bikes); professionals with an economic activity within the perimeter; electric vehicles; fre-
quent commuters. Residents are exempted in most current schemes, essentially for fairness 
reasons. They have sometimes no alternative to crossing the cordon, for instance for special 
shopping or long-distance trips, and, as a result, cannot avoid the charge. They may, how-
ever, be its primary beneficiaries. In London, residents are exempted at 90%. In the case 
of Stockholm, Eliasson and Mattsson (2006) show that the congestion charge’s burden is 
borne mainly by residents of the cordoned area. Motorbikes are exempted in several cit-
ies, including Bergen, London, Milan, and Stockholm, mainly because they generate less 
congestion and pollution. Business rides can be exempted to limit adverse competitiveness 
effects on shops and businesses located within the area, beyond the potential variation in 
customers that the congestion charge may generate (e.g. Leape 2006). Electric vehicles do 
not generate less congestion, but they do generate less pollution, at least in the location 
where they are used. Highly polluted cities, such as London, exempt electric vehicles, pos-
sibly beyond the differential in marginal damage, to spur their adoption by private house-
holds and professional drivers. Frequent commuters are partially exempt in the Norwegian 
schemes and in Milan. While from an efficiency perspective each trip should be charged in 
the same way, from a fairness perspective there may be a rationale for reducing the mar-
ginal charge for people crossing the border particularly often. Following the Norwegian 
example, we define as frequent commuters people who would register for 200 journeys 
across the perimeter and would benefit from a reduced charge on the following 200.
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Revenues generated from the congestion charge could be used in many ways. We con-
sider five of them: earmarked for public transportation improvements; earmarked for meas-
ures improving road infrastructure; earmarked for measures tackling air and noise pol-
lution; earmarked to fund a tunnel, or bridge, to cross the lake of Geneva; redistributed 
back to the population of the Canton of Geneva through a reduction in the annual vehi-
cle registration fee. From an efficiency perspective, the best use of revenues would imply 
allocating them to the general budget for policymakers to determine their use based on 
the expected social return, which may include reducing distortionary taxes. However, we 
refrain to include the option to simply allocate the revenues to the general budget, as the 
literature points to this option as generally politically unfeasible. Reducing existing taxes, 
for instance on labor, tends also to be rather unpopular. Since there is a general consensus 
in the literature that using revenues in the same domain as the charge is generally better 
understood by the general public than an allocation to the general budget or a reduction in 
an non-related tax (Jaensirisak et al. 2005; Steg et al. 2006; Kallbekken and Aasen 2010), 
and given that reasons of power limit the number of possible attribute levels that we could 
test, the options that we consider imply either earmarking or rebating revenues in areas 
related to the congestion charge. That is, we follow the lessons from the literature on pub-
lic support on the importance of issue-linkage. Further, in the context of Switzerland, the 
guidelines imposed by the Swiss Confederation to implement pilot programs for conges-
tion charges explicitly excluded allocating revenues to the general budget.
Earmarking for public transportation improvements usually increases public support 
for road pricing schemes (Grisolía et al. 2015; Corvec et al. 2016), unless people do not 
expect additional funding for public transportation to lead to sizable improvements in their 
daily life (Allen et al. 2006). Public transportation improvements may not only benefit the 
residents of the Canton of Geneva, but also commuters from the surrounding areas. Simi-
larly, improving transport infrastructure, including road and bicycle lanes, could generate 
benefits for individuals living in the areas surrounding the Canton of Geneva. According 
to the abovementioned 2016 ballot on mobility, a majority of citizens in the Canton of 
Geneva supported a policy allocating additional funding to mobility investments, including 
in favor of cyclists and pedestrians. In our context, earmarking for transport infrastructure 
is meant to cover part of the expenditures for those transport policy measures. Earmarking 
for air and noise pollution would address one of the main externalities of driving, beyond 
the incentive effect of the congestion charge. This measure would, however, mainly benefit 
the inhabitants of the Canton of Geneva, which would collect the revenues and spend them 
within its boundaries. The rationale for considering earmarking revenues to fund a road 
infrastructure to cross the Lake Geneva is twofold. First, the population of Geneva recently 
voted on a constitutional article supporting the construction of either a bridge or a tunnel. 
However, how exactly this infrastructure is going to be funded remains open to the deci-
sions of lawmakers. Second, as discussed, the case of Gothenburg suggests that earmarking 
revenues for a specific, large investment may play a significant role in defining public sup-
port, especially if such investment is very controversial among the general public. Reduc-
ing the vehicle registration fee would meet the revenue-neutrality criterion requested by 
the federal government. It would imply a transfer among the vehicle owners of the Canton 
of Geneva from a one-off fee that does not depend on kilometers driven to a congestion 
charge. This redistribution scheme would, however, not benefit individuals whose vehicle 
is registered in another canton or country.
Table 2 summarizes the dimensions and levels considered for the design of the Geneva 
congestion charge, which correspond to the attribute and levels in the empirical analysis of 
public support.
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3  Methodology
3.1  Survey Design
We analyze the question of acceptability as follows. We are interested in public support for 
different hypothetical policy designs. Hence, we opt for stated preferences and more pre-
cisely for a discrete choice experiment (DCE). A DCE allows evaluating individual choices 
and the relative importance of each characteristic (attribute level) of a given option (alter-
native). DCEs are deemed particularly suited to inform the choice and design of multidi-
mensional policies (Hanley et al. 2001). The DCE follows from the random utility model 
(RUM). Most commonly the utility function is defined as additively separable:
where Uij is the unobservable utility that individual i associates with alternative j, Vij is 
the deterministic part of the utility that individual i associates with alternative j depend-
ing on its attributes (X), and ij is the error term, which represents a random component 
associated with individual i and alternative j. It follows that the probability that individual i 
chooses alternative j from the choice set Ci equals the probability that the utility associated 
with alternative j exceeds that associated with all other alternatives h of the choice set. This 
implies:
We usually assume that the error terms are independently and identically distributed with 
an extreme-value distribution. This implies that the probability of alternative j being cho-
sen over all other alternatives in the choice set can be expressed as following a logistic 
distribution (McFadden 1973). The conditional logit model follows:
where  is a scale parameter.
Uij = Vij(Xij) + ij





Table 2  Congestion charge design: characteristics (attributes) and levels
Attributes
Perimeter Charge rate Modulation Exemption Beneficiaries Revenues
Levels Center 0.2 Constant 0% Residents Public transporta-
tion
Ring 1 Peak hours only 25% Motorbikes Transport infra-
structure
2 Peak hours top-up 50% Business deliver-
ies
Pollution reduction
3 Pollution top-up 75% Electric vehicles Tunnel or bridge
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This model is estimated by maximum likelihood.
In our DCE, each respondent is requested to answer to 10 different choice tasks. Each 
choice task includes three alternatives: two different congestion charge designs, leverag-
ing the simplicity of pairwise comparison, and the status quo. The rationale for including 
the status quo is threefold. First, this survey is designed to replicate as closely as possible 
the context of a public ballot, thus mimicking an actual choice context (Harrison 2006). 
In a public ballot, voters have generally the possibility to refuse all options and maintain 
the status quo. Second, the status quo ensures that respondents are not forced to choose 
an alternative they may not desire (Hanley et al. 2001). If the status quo is preferred to the 
proposed alternatives, a model that does not include the option of rejecting all alternatives 
would lead to inaccurate estimates, as respondents would be forced to choose an alternative 
that provides a lower utility than the status quo. Third, the status quo provides us with the 
possibility to measure the overall acceptability of a congestion charge in Geneva, and not 
only the relative preference for a given attribute level.
Each congestion charge design in our survey results from the combination of the differ-
ent levels of the six attributes presented in Table 2: charge rate, perimeter of the charge, 
modulation, level of exemption, exemption beneficiaries (if any), and use of revenues. 
When designing the DCE, we consider both statistical efficiency, which implies minimizing 
the length of confidence intervals, as well as response efficiency, which implies minimizing 
potential measurement error due to respondent inattention (Reed Johnson et al. 2013). A 
perfectly efficient design is balanced and orthogonal, which means that each level, and pair 
of levels, appear an equal number of times within an attribute, and the design, respectively. 
Our design relaxes the restriction of minimal overlap to allow a modest degree of level 
overlap. This means that the same level of an attribute can appear twice in the same choice 
task, but the very same combination of attributes and levels (duplicates) cannot. Respond-
ents use heuristics to simplify decisions. They may for example eliminate an alternative if 
an attribute has a specific level, without even considering the other attribute levels. Level 
overlap can thus improve the precision of the utility estimates.
To improve the measurement of the coefficients of interest, each respondent receives 
one of 100 randomly-generated, pre-tested, versions of the questionnaire.3 To avoid order 
effects, the order of choice tasks is randomized within versions.
The survey was structured as follows. Prior to voting on the 10 hypothetical ballots, 
each respondent received general information about the local context, including figures on 
the level of traffic in Geneva, and the functioning of a congestion charge. We explained 
to respondents that the implementation of such a mechanism in Geneva would allow a 
better use of road infrastructures, reducing traffic at rush hours, and air pollution. In our 
introductory text, we stressed that the impact on traffic, the environment, the household’s 
purchasing power, and the generated revenue would depend on the specific design of the 
congestion charge that will be implemented (if any). After these introductory explanations, 
we provided a description of the attributes and levels. At each point in time during the 
completion of the choice-experiment part of the survey, respondents could access essen-
tial information, describing each attribute, through tooltips. This information is reported 
in Table 8. In providing this information, we reproduced the structure of an official ballot. 
Indeed, in Switzerland, weeks before the ballot day, each voter receives by post a set of 
3 The questionnaire was pre-tested with about 300 individuals. Qualitative interviews had also been con-
ducted, to inform the questionnaire.
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voting materials, which includes detailed information on the items in the agenda. The sur-
vey instrument can be found in the Appendices.
An important, and original feature of this survey is that, on top of the discrete choice 
experiment, we use a split sample design to test the impact on public support of randomized 
information provision concerning the effectiveness of existing congestion charge schemes. 
We use two separate treatments. Hence, about two thirds of our sample receive either one 
or the other treatment, while the remaining third represents our control group, which is sub-
ject to the baseline level of information provided to all respondents. This approach allows 
us to causally infer on the effect of informational treatments on public support. Our treat-
ments focus on two potential benefits of congestion charges, respectively. The first treat-
ment stresses the benefits of congestion charges in reducing congestion, drawing from the 
experiences of existing schemes for which empirical evidence on traffic is available (Leape 
2006; Eliasson et al. 2009; Percoco 2013). The second treatment stresses the benefits of con-
gestion charges in reducing pollution, and noise, drawing from the experiences of existing 
schemes for which empirical evidence on air pollution is available (Croci 2016). The exact 
wording of each treatment, as translated from French, is provided in Table 3.
The rationale for these randomized treatments is the following. While the literature 
on public support emphasizes the information asymmetries between experts, in particu-
lar economists, and the general public, with lay people overestimating (underestimating), 
especially ex ante, the drawbacks (the benefits) of new environmental taxes, the causal 
effect of informational campaigns, addressing these information asymmetries, remains 
largely unexplored. In their review of voting behavior on road pricing, Hensher and Li 
Table 3  Randomized 
informational treatments
Group Information given
Congestion We would like to remind you 
that the goal of the congestion 
charge is to reduce congestion. 
In London and Milan, conges-
tion decreased by 30% and 25%, 
respectively, following the imple-
mentation of a congestion charge. 
In Stockholm, traffic was reduced 
by more than 20%. We expect 
similar effects in Geneva.
Pollution We would like to remind you 
that the goal of the congestion 
charge is to reduce pollution and 
noise due to traffic. In London 
and Stockholm, small particles 
decreased by 10 to 15% and 
carbon dioxyde by 13 to 16% 
following the implementation of 
a congestion charge. The decline 
in pollution has had a posi-
tive impact on public health. In 
addition to improvements in air 
quality, the level of noise declined 
as well. We expect similar effects 
in Geneva.
Control Only standard information provided
 A. Baranzini et al.
1 3
(2013) emphasize the importance of information deficits as one of the main barriers to 
public support. People’s understanding of the effects of a congestion charge, and percep-
tion of its effectiveness, strongly correlates with public support. According to Eliasson and 
Jonsson (2011), beliefs on the potential effects of the congestion charge played a crucial 
role in its approval in Stockholm following a trial period. Local policymakers, in particular, 
emphasized the potential benefits from the congestion charge in terms of better air quality 
(which eventually materialized, as examined in Simeonova et al. 2018).
Hence, additional information needs to be provided to voters before a ballot to ensure 
that they take an informed decision. There is, hence, a strong rationale for trial periods. 
However, trial periods require, themselves, sufficient political buy-in. An alternative is rep-
resented by information provision through informational campaigns. In this respect, Carat-
tini et al. (2017) and Carattini et al. (2019) analyze public support for carbon taxes by pro-
viding information on their impacts assessed with general computable equilibrium (CGE) 
models. Carattini et al. (2017) analyze voting behavior on an energy tax initiative, rejected 
by the Swiss population, and compare it through a discrete choice experiment with alter-
native policy designs, whose effects on different outcomes are provided to respondents as 
simulated by a CGE model. Carattini et al. (2019) provide information from a CGE model 
of the world economy to survey respondents in Australia, India, South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States to analyze public support for a global carbon tax or a 
global system of harmonized carbon taxes. In this paper, we push the frontier further by 
testing directly the provision of additional specific information to randomly-selected sub-
samples for causal inference in combination with a discrete choice experiment.4
3.2  Data and Descriptive Statistics
The survey was administered online in September 2017 by a professional market research 
company with the goal of obtaining about 1,500 responses. We recruited individuals of 
adult age (at least 18 years old) living in the Canton of Geneva, the surrounding regions 
of Switzerland (the district of Nyon in the Canton of Vaud) and of France (Annemasse, 
Bas-Chablais, Genevois, and Pays de Gex). Respondents were informed that the study was 
conducted in partnership with the local authorities and that their response could impact 
actual policymaking. Such an approach builds on Harrison and List (2004) and was already 
applied in Switzerland by Carattini et  al. (2017). Respondents did not receive any mon-
etary compensation. The survey was completed by 1,430 respondents, which corresponds 
to 90% of those who acknowledged receipt of our invitation to fill the survey, but a smaller 
fraction of all prospective respondents who were contacted by the market research com-
pany. The final sample, composed of valid questionnaires only, covers 1,414 respondents. 
In this section, we compare our sample with the underlying population and comment on its 
representativity.
Table 9 in the Appendices displays the summary statistics for the socioeconomic varia-
bles collected in our survey. Swiss residents are overrepresented by design, since our focus 
4 The novel approach that we present in this paper combines a discrete choice experiment with randomized 
information provision about policy effectiveness. Other contexts in which information provision about pol-
icy effectiveness has been provided as a randomized treatment include split-sample surveys (e.g. Kaplowitz 
and McCright 2015) and lab experiments (e.g. Baranzini et  al. 2018a). Unlike before-after comparisons 
(e.g. Rhodes et al. 2014), random assignment to treatment and control groups allows for clean identification 
and limits experimenter effects.
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is mainly on the political constituency that could affect the outcome of a potential ballot on 
the Geneva congestion charge. Hence, Table 11 compares our Geneva-based sample with 
the characteristics of the underlying population of the Canton of Geneva. In Table 12 we 
compare our entire sample to the entire region, known as “Grand-Genève”. In either case, 
if anything, we slightly overestimate the number of cars per inhabitants and the fraction of 
low-educated people, which may lead us to underestimate public support. Finally, Table 10 
in the Appendices provides the standard balance of covariates. Table  10 shows that the 
three groups to which respondents were randomly assigned (pollution, congestion, and 
control) are very well, albeit not perfectly, balanced in terms of covariates. As per standard 
procedure, we thus include covariates as control variables in our empirical estimations of 
the treatment effects.
4  Empirical Results
4.1  Attributes
In this section, we discuss the overall level of public support and the relative preference for 
each attribute. We begin by presenting a set of descriptive statistics for our main outcome 
variables, in Table 4. Overall, 23% of the respondents reject all proposals of a congestion 
charge, no matter the design. Inversely, 23% of our sample always accepts one of the two 
congestion charge schemes proposed in each hypothetical ballot. For the remaining 54%, 
public support is contingent on the design. The average level of public support, measured 
as the number of accepted schemes over the total number of votes, is relatively high in our 
sample, at about 53.66%. Note that two thirds of our sample are subject to additional infor-
mation. For one specific design, average public support reaches 65%. This design implies 
a small perimeter, at the boundaries of the city center, a price of CHF 0.2 per trip applied 
only during peak hours and only to non-residents (residents are fully exempted), and rev-
enues earmarked for investments in public transportation. While the design that receives 
most support is relatively unambitious, there are other designs, which we may expect to 
have a stronger effect on commuters’ behavior, that receive majority support. In what fol-
lows, we identify the attributes and characteristics that increase, or decrease, public sup-
port. We consider that the goal for policymakers is not to find a design that creates unanim-
ity, but get legislation passed.
Public support seems to vary also along standard voter characteristics. On average, pub-
lic support is higher among residents than for the remaining respondents, and among indi-
viduals who already commute by public transport, cycling, or walking. In what follows, we 
also analyze the role of heterogeneity across voters.
We now analyze the main set of findings concerning people’s preferences for the dif-
ferent attributes, and levels, covered by the survey. To this end, we bundle all observations 
together. We note that our analyses do not find any evidence of fatigue and learning effects 
and no significant variation on the time spent per task across tasks.
Table 5 provides the main results. Table 5 displays average marginal effects, for each 
attribute level, as estimated by the conditional logit model. Column (1) provides esti-
mates for the full sample. Column (2) restricts the sample to the residents of the Canton of 
Geneva and column (3) to respondents living outside the Canton of Geneva. Only members 
of the second group would be entitled to vote, in a cantonal ballot in Geneva, on the con-
gestion charge. Note that, as shown in Fig. 1, the perimeter covers only part of the Canton, 
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even when located on the highway ring. Hence, a potential ballot would include as voters 
both people from the urban areas within or close to the perimeters and people from the 
adjacent suburbs and countryside. This makes the situation of Geneva relatively similar 
to that of Stockholm. Recall that the referendum on the congestion charge was held in the 
city of Stockholm, as well as in several neighboring municipalities experiencing different 
degrees of congestion. This contrasts, for instance, with Edinburgh, where only residents of 
the city were entitled to vote.
A standard public choice result is that, the higher the level of a proposed charge, the 
lower its acceptability. This result is confirmed in Table 5, where public support decreases 
almost linearly with the charge. Figure 2 illustrates for each charge rate the average public 
support, across attributes and levels, for both the full sample and the subsample of potential 
voters. Even with very low charge rates, public support never exceeds 50% when the aver-
age over all attributes and levels is taken. As mentioned, however, public support can reach 
majority for some specific designs.
Figure  2 suggests that people in the Canton of Geneva tend to be significantly less 
sensitive to higher charge rates than the remaining individuals in the sample. Note that 
people living in the Canton experience both the direct benefits of the congestion charge, 
through a reduction in congestion and pollution, and the indirect benefits from the use of 
revenues, which takes place mainly at the local level. Table 13 in the Appendices repro-
duces the analysis of Table 5 splitting our sample into three groups: people living within 
the perimeter and people living outside the perimeter, either in the Canton of Geneva or in 
the surrounding areas. Note that since the perimeter changes with the design, the answers 
of some people are attributed to one group for some choice tasks, and to the other group 
for others. As shown in Table 13, non-residents, especially those not living in the Canton 
of Geneva, tend to be much more sensitive to the charge rate than residents. The divergence 
starts, in statistical terms, at a charge rate of CHF 2. In what follows, we consider people’s 




Accept all (%) Reject all (%) Design 
dependent 
(%)
Entire sample 53.66 23.34 22.50 54.16
Residence location
Living within the perimeter 57.77 28.85 20.83 50.32
Living in the Canton of Geneva, but outside the 
perimeter
51.28 23.26 25.38 51.16
Living outside the Canton of Geneva 50.35 18.04 23.27 58.65
Commuting mode
Commuting by car 48.90 17.20 25.17 57.63
Commuting by motorbike 50.85 27.85 30.38 41.77
Commuting by car or motorbike 49.19 18.75 25.93 55.32
Commuting by public transportation, cycling 
and walking
59.68 27.09 16.52 56.39
Commuting frequency
Living in the Canton of Geneva 55.79 27.38 21.95 50.67
6-7 trips/week to Geneva 53.31 22.29 24.54 53.17
1-5 trips/week to Geneva 51.98 20.34 21.88 57.78
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preferences for the other attributes, analyzing the behavior of the full sample, based on 
Table 5, as well as comparing residents and non-residents, based on Table 13.
When taking the entire sample, we observe no specific preference for either perime-
ter, i.e. a smaller perimeter corresponding to the urban center, and a larger one, located 
on the highway ring. This may be due, however, to the fact that the sample as a whole 
includes both people who would benefit from a smaller perimeter, as well as people for 
which the prediction is more ambiguous. Non-residents are expected to have a preference 
for a smaller perimeter, since they do not experience the benefits of a congestion charge, 
except perhaps for a faster commute, and with a smaller perimeter they would save money 
on all trips with a destination point between the two perimeters. For those who switch from 
one subsample to the other, the effect is ambiguous. Depending on where they work, with 
a larger perimeter they may no longer need to cross the cordon to commute. Note that 
about 57% of them work in the area within the smallest perimeter. Furthermore, with a 
larger perimeter, they may have the chance to live within the area and enjoy a better living 
environment, and to be eligible for potential exemptions for residents when crossing the 
cordon.
In Table 13, we do find a difference when comparing residents and non-residents. Non-
residents living outside the Canton of Geneva have, as expected, a preference for a smaller 
perimeter. Currently, 26% of them work between the two perimeters and 88% commute by 
car or motorbike. Another 40% of our respondents live in the Canton of Geneva but outside 
the large perimeter. 40% of them work in-between the two perimeters and 60% commute 
by car or motorbike.
We now turn to the preferences for various modulation options. We observe, in gen-
eral, that the least preferred option is the one involving a surcharge based on kilometers 
driven. No preference is observed for a top-up, be it based on pollution or peak hours, com-
pared to a constant pricing. This confirms the trade-off, observed in the literature, between 
efficiency and public support. As suggested by Li and Hensher (2010) and Hensher et al. 
(2013), people may have a preference for fixed over variable charges, because their effect 
on the household budget is more predictable. In the survey, we only consider top-ups, i.e. 
additions that make the charge higher. In the specific case of the distance top-up, however, 
we should note that privacy concerns may also influence public support (or lack thereof). 
While this modulation integrates more closely marginal damages into marginal costs, the 
Fig. 2  Charge rate and public 
support
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Table 5  Estimates from conditional logit: full sample, voters, and non-voters
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Continuous p-values are provided in Table 21
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Potential voters Non-voters
Charge rate
CHF 0 (reference)
 CHF 0.2 − 0.051*** (0.017) − 0.065*** (0.023) − 0.034 (0.025)
 CHF 1 − 0.109*** (0.017) − 0.099*** (0.024) − 0.119*** (0.025)
 CHF 2 − 0.195*** (0.017) − 0.173*** (0.023) − 0.22*** (0.024)
 CHF 3 − 0.262*** (0.017) − 0.232*** (0.023) − 0.296*** (0.025)
 CHF 4 − 0.283*** (0.017) − 0.239*** (0.023) − 0.34*** (0.024)
 CHF 5 − 0.33*** (0.017) − 0.291*** (0.023) − 0.375*** (0.025)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
 Ring − 0.008 (0.007) 0.0001 (0.009) − 0.02* (0.011)
Modulation
Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only 0.018** (0.009) 0.009 (0.012) 0.029** (0.014)
 Peak hours top-up 0.008 (0.009) − 0.0003 (0.012) 0.017 (0.014)
 Distance top-up − 0.045*** (0.01) − 0.073*** (0.013) − 0.009 (0.015)
 Pollution top-up − 0.008 (0.009) − 0.016 (0.012) 0.001 (0.014)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% 0.002 (0.009) 0.0004 (0.013) 0.004 (0.014)
 50% 0.036*** (0.009) 0.036*** (0.013) 0.036** (0.014)
 75% 0.044*** (0.01) 0.041*** (0.013) 0.049*** (0.014)
 100% 0.069*** (0.01) 0.046*** (0.013) 0.098*** (0.015)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
 Residents 0.029*** (0.01) 0.060*** (0.013) − 0.014 (0.014)
 Motorbikes − 0.015 (0.010) − 0.001 (0.014) − 0.035** (0.015)
 Frequent commuters 0.016* (0.01) 0.022* (0.013) 0.006 (0.014)
 Electric vehicles − 0.023** (0.010) − 0.003 (0.013) − 0.05*** (0.016)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
 Public transportation 0.082*** (0.010) 0.084*** (0.013) 0.080*** (0.015)
 Transport infrastructure 0.050*** (0.01) 0.056*** (0.013) 0.044*** (0.015)
 Pollution reduction 0.051*** (0.010) 0.062*** (0.013) 0.039** (0.016)
 Tunnel or bridge 0.035*** (0.010) 0.025* (0.014) 0.05*** (0.016)
Number of respondents 1414 782 632
Number of observations 42,408 23,454 18,954
Pseudo R2 0.0748 0.0523 0.1148
Designing Effective and Acceptable Road Pricing Schemes
1 3
associated system could also allow the government to track with relatively high precision 
the movements of each citizen. In Hong Kong, for instance, the implementation of such a 
system was opposed on privacy grounds (Hau 1990; Khan 2001). According to Table 5, the 
most popular modulation implies a charging scheme that only applies to peak hours, which 
is the least stringent option, everything else equal. This option, as shown in column (3) of 
Table 5 and in Table 13, is favored in particular by people living outside the Canton, who 
may be able to adjust the timing of part of their rides through the congestion area. Note that 
64% of them work in either one of the perimeters and a large majority of them commute by 
car or motorbike. Table 14 confirms that, in general, people commuting by car or motor-
bike would have a preference for a congestion charge that only covers peak hours.
From Table 5, we observe that, everything else equal, a higher exemption level leads 
to higher public support. This result is consistent with the effect of the charge rate. The 
relationship between the level of exemption and public support is again relatively linear. 
The same effect is observed for both the full sample and the subsample of potential vot-
ers. Note, however, that inhabitants of the Canton of Geneva, as shown in column (2), 
tend to be slightly less generous in the provision of exemptions. This makes sense. In most 
designs, revenues are recycled in a way that favors only, or mostly, people living in the 
Canton. Moreover, these would also benefit more from less congestion and better environ-
mental quality.
In terms of beneficiaries, we find, as expected, a strong support for (partial) exemptions 
for residents living within the cordon. Unsurprisingly, this result is driven mainly by peo-
ple living within the cordon, as shown in Table 13. That is, a trade-off between efficiency 
and acceptability may also be present when it comes to exemptions. As discussed, par-
tial exemptions may be efficient if some vehicles are likely to generate less externalities. 
However, in our sample exemptions to motorbikes and electric vehicles receive, if any-
thing, lower public support than business deliveries, the reference category. According to 
the Federal Office of Statistics, the penetration of electric vehicles in Switzerland is still 
very low, at about 0.3% of the total fleet in 2017. In the Canton of Geneva, in 2017, there 
were only 530 electric cars and 150 electric scooters, which also corresponds to the 0.2-
0.3% range. The only group that seems to strongly support exemptions for motorbikes, are 
the bikers themselves, as shown in Table 16. A strong preference, driven by the response 
of residents, is found for exemptions to frequent commuters. Although efficiency dictates 
that each ride should be charged in the same way, everything else equal, fairness reasons 
could dominate people’s preferences. To further analyze the preference for exemptions for 
frequent commuters, we divide the sample into two subsamples, based on the number of 
journeys per week to Geneva. Table 15 presents the relevant findings. As shown in column 
(2), the preference for partial exemptions for frequent commuters is mainly driven by peo-
ple currently driving across the hypothetical cordon about 6-7 times a week.
In terms of revenue recycling, in line with the literature, we observe a strong prefer-
ence for earmarking for improvements in public transportation. The preference for public 
transportation over the other revenue use options is shared by all subgroups analyzed in 
Tables 13, 15, and 16. The revenue-neutral option of redistributing revenues back to the 
population through a reduction in the vehicle registration fee, the variable of reference, is 
the least popular option for all groups, including the inhabitants of the Canton of Geneva, 
who would benefit from it. This finding is also in line with the literature. People may tend 
to have a preference for earmarking over revenue-neutral designs, even when there is a 
direct linkage between the new charge and the mode of rebate. We also find little support 
for financing a tunnel or bridge across the Lake Geneva. This result mirrors the case of 
Gothenburg, where part of the opposition to the congestion charge was related to the use of 
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its revenues for a rail tunnel under the city (Börjesson and Kristoffersson 2015; Andersson 
and Nässén 2016).
Overall, we find that most design parameters affect public support. Within designs, dif-
ferences across respondents seem to be mainly due to the respondent’s residence location 
and commuting mode. That is, the standard public choice tenet that people’s preferences 
are mainly driven by their own interests seem to be largely confirmed in our context (see 
Downs 1957; Kramer 1983; Ferejohn 1986). However, no matter the different individual 
characteristics, we confirm the important trade-off between efficiency and acceptability. 
Section 4.3 further investigates the role of heterogeneity within our sample.
4.2  Information
In this section, we analyze the impact of the randomized informational treatments on pub-
lic support for the different designs. Overall public support, measured again as the num-
ber of votes in favor of a congestion charge over the total number of votes, amounts to 
51.07% in the control group, 52.83% in the Congestion treatment, and 57.07% in the Pol-
lution treatment. Figure 3 compares public support across different charge rates for each 
treatment compared to the control group. The left panel shows the Congestion treatment, 
the right panel the Pollution treatment. Both treatments tend to increase public support, but 
the Congestion treatment does so only marginally. Stressing the observed effects of exist-
ing congestion charges on traffic may not affect behavior in our sample. People in our sam-
ple may tend, in general, to factor in the effect of a congestion charge in reducing traffic. 
Note that in French, and so in our survey, the term for congestion charge is “péage urbain” 
(urban toll), which does not explicitly relate to congestion.
The difference in public support in the control group and in the Pollution treatment is 
very small at low charge rates, when public support is relatively high, but increases with 
policy stringency. To test whether this difference is statistically significant and to assess the 
pattern of divergence, we analyze the causal effect of both randomized treatments on pub-
lic support at each charge rate. Table 6 displays the results (see Table 17 in the "Appendix" 
for the inclusion of control variables, to which our results are robust). As expected follow-
ing Fig. 3, regardless of the charge rate, the Congestion treatment has no significant impact 
on public support. The difference observed in Fig. 3 is not only marginal, but also statisti-
cally insignificant. The coefficient is also statistically insignificant for the Pollution treat-
ment, as long as the charge rate remains below CHF 2. Starting from CHF 2, we observe 
Fig. 3  Informational treatments, charge rate, and public support
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a statistically significant divergence in public support between the Pollution treatment and 
the control group.
In Table 7, we test whether this result carries over also to different modulations (see 
Table 18 in the "Appendix" for the inclusion of control variables, to which our results are 
robust). Recall that we consider several options that deviate from constant pricing through-
out the day, including a series of top-up charges. We are now interested in analyzing the 
impact of the informational treatments on public support for each modulation, i.e. whether 
the randomized informational treatments also lead to higher support for more stringent 
designs. While the effect of the Congestion treatment remains marginal, we do observe 
higher support for a peak hour top-up as well as for a pollution top-up. Support for the 
pollution top-up increases by about 5%. Hence, the findings show that, in our survey, the 
Table 6  The impact of informational treatments on public support, for each charge rate
Estimates report average marginal effects from logit
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Continuous p-values are provided in Table 22 
**p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHF 0.2 CHF 1 CHF 2 CHF 3 CHF 4 CHF 5
Congestion 0.020 0.020 − 0.003 0.002 − 0.001 0.012
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Pollution 0.002 0.012 0.042** 0.037** 0.042*** 0.038***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Number of respondents 1414 1414 1414 1414 1414 1414
Number of observations 4,736 4,711 4,702 4,702 4,711 4,710
R
2 0.0003 0.0002 0.0019 0.0017 0.0027 0.0021
Table 7  The impact of informational treatments on public support, for each modulation
Estimates report average marginal effects from logit
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Continuous p-values are provided in Table 23
***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant Peak hours only Peak hours top-up Distance top-up Pollution top-up
Congestion 0.019 − 0.007 0.001 0.025 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Pollution 0.018 0.017 0.046*** 0.022 0.045***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of respond-
ents
1414 1414 1414 1414 1414
Number of observa-
tions
5’638 5’678 5’646 5’659 5’651
R
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.002 0.0007 0.0018
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randomized informational treatments contribute to close the gap between efficiency and 
acceptability.
4.3  Heterogeneity
In this section, we further investigate the role of heterogeneity across individuals to better 
understand how preferences vary with voter characteristics. To this end, we apply a latent-
class model. We can identify 5 latent classes in our data.5 The number of respondents per 
class goes from 201 (class 5) to 393 (class 1). Overall public support varies between 97% 
(in Class 1) to 1.37% (in Class 4). Hence, we can define Class 1 as (virtually) always in 
favor, and Class 4 as (virtually) always against. Overall public support is 60%, 36%, and 
76% in Classes 2, 3, and 5, respectively.
Table  19 in the Appendices shows how attribute and level preferences change across 
classes, based on a conditional logit model. In Table 20, also in the Appendices, we use a 
multinomial logit model to analyze the composition of the different classes.
This analysis provides a set of additional findings. While over the whole sample we 
observe a clear negative relationship between the level of the charge and public support, 
the latent class analysis points to varying degrees of price sensitivity as well as a prefer-
ence, in three classes, for a moderate charge over no charge. In general, Classes 1 and 2 
tend to be relatively price inelastic, while in Classes 3, 4, and 5, public support reacts much 
more strongly to an increase in the charge. In Class 1 and 5, there is a preference for a 
positive charge compared to no charge at all, after which the standard negative relationship 
between charge rate and public support is observed. The other differences among Classes 
1, 2, and 5, which all show (relatively) high support, relate with modulation and use of rev-
enue. In Class 2, no modulation is statistically preferred to a constant modulation. Class 2 
also shows a preference for large exemptions, especially for residents, frequent commuters, 
and electric vehicles. Class 3 shows the strongest price sensitivity. While a small charge is 
preferred to the status quo, public support drops rapidly as the charge increases. Respond-
ents in Class 3 also exhibit strong preferences for large exemptions, similarly to Class 5. 
Respondents in Class 5 tend to favor revenue earmarking for the tunnel, or bridge, crossing 
the Lake Geneva.
Members of Class 1 are more likely to be residents of the Swiss Cantons of Geneva 
and Vaud and located within the area of the hypothetical perimeters. Members of Class 2, 
and Class 3, tend to be relatively younger than the rest of the sample. Car and motorbike 
commuters are overrepresented in Class 3. Members of Class 4 tend to be residents of the 
Swiss Cantons of Geneva and Vaud, who commute by car or motorbike. Members of Class 
5 are more likely to live in France, hence the preference for the tunnel, or bridge, cross-
ing the Lake Geneva, which would benefit mainly individuals living in the surrounding of 
Geneva and trying to bypass part of the city center.
5 As per standard procedure, we minimize the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian infor-
mation criterion (BIC). AIC (BIC) values are given as follows: for two classes, 23049 (23002); for three 
classes, 21902 (21831); for four classes, 21658 (21563); for five classes, 21602 (21483); for six classes, 
21644 (21501).
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5  Conclusions
Economists have long advocated for congestion charges to internalize the externalities of 
driving. However, only a few cities in the world have implemented a congestion charge. 
Others have considered it, but later abandoned it before lawmakers would suffer a politi-
cal defeat. In some other cities, proposals for a congestion charge were abandoned after an 
unsuccessful public ballot.
Switzerland recently changed its regulation to allow congestion charge trials in a num-
ber of cities willing to act as forerunners. Geneva, one of the most congested cities in the 
world, stepped forward. Policymakers are currently considering a potential design to be tri-
aled over the next few years. In a country where people vote very often, reaching sufficient 
public support for such a radical change in transportation policy represents a sine qua non. 
This paper builds on the theoretical literature, and draws lessons from the existing conges-
tion charge schemes in the world, to put forward a set of plausible designs for a Geneva 
congestion charge. Then, it evaluates public support for each of them, using a large survey 
of respondents from Geneva and the surrounding regions of both Switzerland and France. 
The literature on public support for environmental policy suggests that acceptability may 
change dramatically with the design. Hence, public support for each policy design is tested 
with a discrete choice experiment. The parameters considered for the design are the fol-
lowing: charge rate, perimeter of the charge, modulation of the charge, level of exemp-
tions, beneficiaries of exemptions (if any), and use of revenues. According to the literature, 
information asymmetries may represent another obstacle to public support. The general 
public may not expect congestion charges to work as well as economists do. However, no 
causal evidence on the effect of additional information on public support for congestion 
charges has so far been provided. With a split sample design on top of the standard discrete 
choice experiment, we test the effectiveness of two randomized informational treatments 
stressing the benefits of congestion charges for abating pollution and reducing congestion, 
respectively.
Our findings confirm the importance of design for public support. Public support 
decreases (increases) considerably when increasing the level of the charge (exemptions), 
although important heterogeneity in the sample is observed and some groups tend to be 
much more sensitive to the level of the charge than others. Heterogeneity determines most 
of the findings in our paper. Preferences for either a more compact perimeter or an extended 
area depend on where people live and how they commute. Our findings also highlight an 
important trade-off between acceptability and efficiency. While on efficiency ground con-
gestion charging should match as closely as possible the marginal damage of driving, peo-
ple tend to have a strong preference for a constant, predictable modulation. Similarly, peo-
ple do not favor exemptions to the vehicles causing less congestion or pollution, such as 
motorbikes, or electric vehicles. Only bikers support exemptions for motorbikes. Residents 
demand exemptions for residents. Frequent commuters have a preference for a scheme 
providing a discount when prepaying for many rides, as in use in Norwegian cities. Most 
people demand earmarking for improvements in public transportation. Revenue-neutral 
schemes, favored by the Swiss federal authorities, are especially disliked by the general 
public. Finally, we show that information asymmetries do contribute to lower public sup-
port, as our randomized informational campaigns contribute to higher public support. That 
is, in the context of our study, we find that tackling information asymmetries increases 
public support. The treatment providing information about expected pollution reduction 
increases public support the most, especially for relatively ambitious designs.
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A set of policy implications follow from our results. First, testing the waters to quantify 
the trade-offs between public support and efficiency for different designs is crucial, as it 
may reduce the risk that policymakers would make the wrong bet, and hence face a politi-
cal failure that could prevent the implementation of a congestion charge for a long time. 
Second, providing information to voters, for instance drawing on the successful experience 
of other schemes, may contribute to close the gap between efficiency and public support. 
This is especially true for benefits that may not be immediately perceived by voters, such 
as improved air quality. The COVID-19 pandemic has, for instance, provided an excellent 
opportunity to policymakers around the world to convey to voters information about how 
their city and the sky above it would look like with fewer cars around. Third, identifying 
designs that can gather support among the local residents as well as commuters from the 
surrounding areas, and at the same time have a bite, may be especially hard. In line with 
standard public choice tenets, voters’ preferences tend to be very much driven by their own 
costs and benefits. Hence, depending on who has the right to say over the implementation 
of a congestion charge, public support can vary considerably. However, we identify several 
designs that reach and exceed majority support. In particular, public support is the high-
est among the residents of Geneva, who will be ultimately tasked with taking a decision. 
While this bodes well for the prospects of a congestion charge in Geneva, the variation in 
public support across designs should remind policymakers of the importance of carefully 




Mobility demand in Geneva has been sharply increasing for decades. In the center of 
the agglomeration, around 1.5 millions trips per day are undertaken by around 520,000 
vehicles.
A congestion charge aims at reducing traffic jams and traffic-related pollution by charg-
ing motorized vehicles circulating in a defined perimeter. The introduction of a congestion 
charge would encourage more efficient modes of transportation, reduce commuting times 
and air pollution, leading to a better use of the infrastructure. Coupled with other traffic 
management measures, the charge would allow to meet the goals of the law aiming for a 
coherent and balanced mobility, accepted by a large majority of Geneva’s voters in June 
2016.
A congestion charge can be designed in different ways (perimeter, charge rate, use of 
revenues, exemptions etc.). The impacts on traffic, the environment, people’s purchasing 
power, and the revenues generated will depend on the specific design of the implemented 
congestion charge.
Several scenarios are currently under consideration. You have here the chance to express 
your preferences. Your responses will contribute to determine the interest in the introduc-
tion of a congestion charge in Geneva and under which conditions. In your answers, we 
will ask you to take into account all impacts of a possible congestion charge, which could 
be environmental, economic or social.
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To facilitate your understanding, you will find in the next page a description of the pos-
sible characteristics of a congestion charge.
Main characteristics of a congestion charge
• Perimeter: As shown by the following map, the charging area could correspond either 
to the red perimeter (center) or the blue one (until the highway non included). Traffic 
on the federal highways is not affected by the congestion charge.
• Charge level: It would lie between a minimum of CHF 0.2 per passage through the 
cordon defining the perimeter and a maximum of CHF 5.-. The price would be charged 
both when entering and exiting the zone according to the modulation and exemptions.
• Modulation: The charge would be effective from Monday to Friday (6am-7pm), except 
on bank holidays. The price could vary in presence of pollution peaks (CHF 1.- top-
up), according to the time of the day (CHF 1.50 top-up at peak-hours, 6:30am-9am and 
4pm-7pm) or depending on the kilometers driven inside the perimeter (CHF 0.20 per 
kilometer driven). Alternatively, the charge could be effective only during peak hours 
(6:30am-9am and 4pm-7pm).
• Use of revenues: According to the first estimations, the congestion charge could gener-
ate revenues reaching CHF 50-100 million per year depending on the congestion charge 
characteristics. These revenues could be used in different ways: to finance public trans-
portation in the Canton of Geneva (more frequency, enhanced quality, line extensions, 
lower off-peak fares), to finance a bridge or a tunnel to cross the Lake of Geneva, to 
adjust the vehicle registration fee in the Canton of Geneva, and to finance measures to 
reduce air and noise pollution.
• Exemptions: Emergency vehicles and those driven by disabled would not be subject 
to the congestion charge. Different exemption levels could be given to residents of the 
perimeter, scooters/motorbikes, electric vehicles, business deliveries, and frequent 




We would like to remind you that the goal of the congestion charge is to reduce congestion. 
In London and Milan, congestion decreased by 30% and 25%, respectively, following the 
implementation of a congestion charge. In Stockholm, traffic was reduced by more than 
20%. We expect similar effects in Geneva.
Pollution treatment
We would like to remind you that the goal of the congestion charge is to reduce pollution 
and noise due to traffic. In London and Stockholm, small particles decreased by 10 to 15% 
and carbon dioxide by 13 to 16% following the implementation of a congestion charge. The 
decline in pollution has had a positive impact on public health. In addition to improvements 
in air quality, the level of noise declined as well. We expect similar effects in Geneva.
Common information
In what follows, you will vote 10 times on a congestion charge design. In each ballot, you 
have to choose among three alternatives: two scenarios with different congestion charges 
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and the current situation without a congestion charge. During the vote, you will have access 
to further information in tooltips.
Please evaluate all proposition as if they would have been proposed by the local govern-
ment and vote for your preferred option. There is no good or bad response.
Before the ballots, you will face an introductory question.
Introductory question
Which mode of transportation do you use most frequently (at least 4 times a week)? 
 ◻  Car
 ◻  Bus,tramway
 ◻  Train
 ◻  Motorbike
 ◻  Bicycle
 ◻  Walking
Vote
If you would have to vote between these alternatives, which one would you prefer?
Click on the underlined elements to get more information. 
Attributes
Perimeter Charge rate Modulation Exemption Beneficiaries Revenues
Levels Center 0.2 Constant 0% Residents Public transporta-
tion
Ring 1 Peak hours only 25% Motorbikes Transport infra-
structure
2 Peak hours top-up 50% Business deliver-
ies
Pollution reduction
3 Pollution top-up 75% Electric vehicles Tunnel or bridge






Perimeter: The map in Fig. 1 appears.
Charge rate: Drivers are charged both when entering and exiting the perimeter.
Peak hours only: Drivers are charged only during peak hours (6.30 am to 9 am and 4 
pm to 7 pm).
Peak hours top-up: Drivers are charged from 6 am to 7 pm and there is a surcharge 
during peak hours (from 6.30 am to 9 am and from 4 pm to 7 pm).
Distance top-up: Drivers are charged from 6 am to 7 pm and there is a surcharge of 
CHF 0.20 per kilometer driven within the perimeter.
Pollution top-up: Drivers are charged from 6 am to 7 pm and there is a surcharge of 
CHF 1 when pollution is high.
Constant: Drivers are charged from 6 am to 7 pm at a constant rate.
Frequent commuters: The prepayment of 200 passages across the perimeter provides a 
discount on the following 200 passages.
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Business deliveries: Businesses with an economic activity within the perimeter can 
benefit from an exemption.
No exemption: No exemption is granted, except for emergency vehicles and disabled 
individuals.
Public transportation: Revenues earmarked for public transportation in the Canton of 
Geneva (Transports Publics Genevois) with the objective to improve quality, frequency, 
and coverage, as well as to lead to lower fares during off-peak times.
Tunnel or bridge: Revenues earmarked for a tunnel or bridge crossing the Lake Geneva 
(Grande Traversée du Lac) as well as for accompanying measures to manage road traffic 
in the center of the agglomeration.
Transport infrastructure: Revenues earmarked for improvements in transport supply 
such as the road network and the cycling lanes.
Pollution: Revenues earmarked for measures abating air and noise pollution such as 
sound-absorbing coating.
Vehicle registration fee: Revenues redistributed to the population of the Canton of 
Geneva via a reduction in the annual vehicle registration fee.
Mobility equipment
Here, we ask you some questions about your equipment in transportation passes and in 
cars. 
1. Do you have a driving license allowing you to drive a car?
 ◻  Yes
 ◻  No
2. How many cars do you have in your household? Take also into account company cars 
that are always at your disposal.
_ Car(s)
3. Do you have the possibility to borrow a car from a relative or your family? 
 ◻  Yes
 ◻  No
4. Do you have a monthly or annual pass for the Swiss public transportation system (except 
the Half Fare Travelcard) or the local mass transit system (TPG, Unireso, etc)? 
 ◻  Yes
 ◻  No
Your trips to Geneva
To better know your mobility habits we ask you some questions about your trips to and 
from the center of Geneva. 
 1. What is your municipality of residence?
 2. What is your current activity? 
 ◻  Student
 ◻  At home
 ◻  Full-time or part-time worker
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 ◻  Job seeking
 ◻  Retiree
 3. In which municipality do you work/study?
 4. Which mode of transportation do you mainly use to commute to your working or 
studying place? Only one response possible. If you use several transportation modes 
for this journey, indicate the one that you use on the last part of the trip. 
 ◻  Car
 ◻  Mass transit (bus/tramway)
 ◻  Train
 ◻  Motorbike
 ◻  Bicycle
 ◻  Walking
 5. What is the average duration of your trip from home to your working place or from 
home to your studying place (one-way) in minutes?
_ minutes
 6. At what time do you leave your residency in general for this trip?
 7. When commuting to your working or studying place, do you cross the municipalities 
of Geneva, Lancy or Carouge ? 
 ◻  Yes
 ◻  No
 8. Are you sometimes commuting to your working place with another mode of transporta-
tion?
 ◻  Yes
 ◻  No
 9. If yes, which one? Only one response possible. If you use several transportation modes 
for this journey, indicate the one that you use on the last part of the trip. 
 ◻  Car
 ◻  Mass transit
 ◻  Train
 ◻  Motorbikes
 ◻  Bicycle
 ◻  Walking
 10. What is the average length of this trip? (in minutes)
 11. At what time do you leave in general your residency for this trip?
 12. Is it possible for you to commute by mass transit to your working place? 
 ◻  Yes
 ◻  No
 13. What is the average duration of this trip by mass transit? (in minutes)
_ minutes
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 14. Do you sometimes, during the week (Monday to Friday), cross the municipalities of 
Geneva, Carouge or Lancy by car for shopping or leisure activities (visiting friends or 
family, restaurants, sport, etc.)? 
 ◻  Yes
 ◻  No
 15. Do you sometimes leave your municipality of residence by car for shopping or leisure 
activities (visiting friends or family, restaurants,sport, etc) during the week (Monday 
to Friday)? 
 ◻  Yes
 ◻  No
 16. Could you indicate the destination of the most recent trip that you undertook by car 
for shopping or leisure activities?
 17. How long was this trip? (in minutes)
_ minutes
 18. At what time did you leave your residence for this trip?
Respondent profile 
1. Are you? 
 ◻  A female
 ◻  A male
2. How old are you?
_ years old
3. How many people usually live in your household, included you? (Include your family, 
but also any person living at least 4 days a week in your household)
_ Adults _ Children (0-18 years)
4. What is the last diploma that you obtained? 
 ◻  Compulsory school certificate, no diploma, primary school certificate
 ◻  Apprenticeship
 ◻  Post-compulsory school : secondary level, high school
 ◻  Diploma of higher education (DEUG, DUT, BTS)
 ◻   University degree (undergraduate, master, PhD) : university, institute of tech-
nology, and university of applied sciences.
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5. What is the total monthly gross income (including benefits and other subsidies) of your 
household, taking into account the income of all the members of the household? (In 
Euros/CHF) 
 ◻  Less than 900
 ◻  From 901 to 1 500
 ◻  From 1 501 to 2 000
 ◻  From 2 001 to 3 000
 ◻  From 3 001 to 4 000
 ◻  From 4 001 to 5 000
 ◻  From 5 001 to 6 000
 ◻  From 6 001 to 7 000
 ◻  From 7 001 to 8 000
 ◻  From 8 001 to 9 000
 ◻  From 9 001 to 10 000
 ◻  From 10 001 to 11 000
 ◻  From 11 001 to 12 000
 ◻  More than 12 000
 ◻  I do not want to answer.
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Tables
Table 8  Summary information available at any time to respondents
Variable Description
Perimeter The map in Fig. 1 appears.
Charge rate Drivers are charged both when entering and exiting the perimeter.
Peak hours only Drivers are charged only during peak hours (6.30 am to 9 am and 4 pm to 7 pm).
Peak hours top-up Drivers are charged from 6 am to 7 pm and there is a surcharge during peak hours 
(from 6.30 am to 9 am and from 4 pm to 7 pm).
Distance top-up Drivers are charged from 6 am to 7 pm and there is a surcharge of CHF 0.20 per 
kilometer driven within the perimeter.
Pollution top-up Drivers are charged from 6 am to 7 pm and there is a surcharge of CHF 1 when 
pollution is high.
Constant Drivers are charged from 6 am to 7 pm at a constant rate.
Frequent commuters The prepayment of 200 passages across the perimeter provides a discount on the 
following 200 passages.
Business deliveries Businesses with an economic activity within the perimeter can benefit from an 
exemption.
No exemption No exemption is granted, except for emergency vehicles and disabled individuals.
Public transportation Revenues earmarked for public transportation in the Canton of Geneva (Trans-
ports Publics Genevois) with the objective of improving quality, frequency, and 
coverage, as well as to lead to lower fares during off-peak times.
Tunnel or bridge Revenues earmarked for a tunnel or bridge crossing the Lake Geneva (Grande 
Traversée du Lac) as well as for accompanying measures to manage road traffic 
in the center of the agglomeration.
Transport infrastructure Revenues earmarked for improvements in transport infrastructure such as the road 
network and cycling lanes.
Pollution Revenues earmarked for measures abating air and noise pollution such as sound-
absorbing coating.
Vehicle registration fee Revenues redistributed to the population of the Canton of Geneva via a reduction 
in the annual vehicle registration fee.
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Sample Characteristics and Representativity
Table 9  Sample composition
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N
Gender (female) 0.512 0.500 0 1 1414
Age 41.789 13.738 18 77 1414
Household size 2.252 1.677 0 10 1414
Number of cars in household 1.405 0.752 0 5 1171
Public transportation pass holder 0.500 0.500 0 1 1222
Household monthly income
< CHF 900 0.023 0.151 0 1 995
CHF 901 - CHF 1,500 0.021 0.144 0 1 995
CHF 1,501 - CHF 2,000 0.02 0.139 0 1 995
CHF 2,001 - CHF 3,000 0.037 0.188 0 1 995
CHF 3,001 - CHF 4,000 0.062 0.242 0 1 995
CHF 4,001 - CHF 5,000 0.070 0.255 0 1 995
CHF 5,001 - CHF 6,000 0.079 0.269 0 1 995
CHF 6,001 - CHF 7,000 0.062 0.240 0 1 995
CHF 7,001 - CHF 8,000 0.050 0.219 0 1 995
CHF 8,001 - CHF 9,000 0.057 0.231 0 1 995
CHF 9,001 - CHF 10,000 0.053 0.224 0 1 995
CHF 10,001 - CHF 11,000 0.039 0.193 0 1 995
CHF 11,001 - CHF 12,000 0.033 0.178 0 1 995
> CHF 12,000 0.099 0.299 0 1 995
Education level
Compulsory schooling 0.065 0.247 0 1 1398
Apprenticeship 0.199 0.4 0 1 1398
Post-compulsory school 0.255 0.436 0 1 1398
Superior first cycle degree 0.107 0.309 0 1 1398
Superior second cycle degree 0.362 0.481 0 1 1398
Residence area
Switzerland 0.714 0.452 0 1 1414
  Canton of Geneva 0.553 0.497 0 1 1414
  Canton of Vaud 0.161 0.367 0 1 1414
France 0.286 0.452 0 1 1414
  Genevois 0.039 0.193 0 1 1414
  Gex 0.127 0.333 0 1 1414
  Haute-Savoie 0.031 0.174 0 1 1414
  Annemasse agglomeration 0.089 0.285 0 1 1414
Commuting
Car 0.466 0.499 0 1 999
Bus and tramway 0.246 0.431 0 1 999
Train 0.091 0.288 0 1 999
Motorcycle 0.079 0.270 0 1 999
Bicycle 0.050 0.218 0 1 999
Walking 0.067 0.250 0 1 999
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Table 11  Socioeconomic 
characteristics of the underlying 
population: Geneva
Source: All variables come from the Cantonal Office of Statistics
Variable Geneva Sample
Mean Mean
Gender (female) 0.515 0.567
Number of cars per inhabitant 0.448 0.635
Education level
Compulsory schooling 0.286 0.31
Secondary education 0.326 0.353
Tertiary education 0.388 0.326
Commuting
Car and motorcycle 0.45 0.434
Table 12  Socioeconomic 
characteristics of the underlying 
population - entire metropolitan 
area (“Grand-Genève”)
Source: All variables come from the Cross-Border Observatory for 
Statistics and the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics
Variable Grand-Genève Sample
Mean Mean
Gender (female) 0.513 0.512
Number of cars per inhabitant 0.533 0.687
Education level
Compulsory schooling 0.205 0.265
Secondary education 0.349 0.362





Car and motorcycle 0.57 0.545
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Additional empirical results
Table 13  Estimates from conditional logit: residents of the perimeter, living in the Canton of Geneva but 
outside the perimeters, not living in the Canton of Geneva
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Continuous p-values are provided in Table 24
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Residents Living in the Canton of 
Geneva but outside the 
perimeters




  CHF 0.2 −0.053* (0.028) −0.088** (0.042) −0.034 (0.025)
  CHF 1 −0.072** (0.029) −0.150*** (0.039) −0.119*** (0.025)
  CHF 2 −0.144*** (0.029) −0.231*** (0.039) −0.220*** (0.024)
  CHF 3 −0.215*** (0.028) −0.264*** (0.038) −0.296*** (0.025)
  CHF 4 −0.210*** (0.029) −0.302*** (0.038) −0.340*** (0.024)
  CHF 5 −0.268*** (0.029) −0.336*** (0.038) −0.375*** (0.025)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
  Ring −0.005 (0.012) −0.008 (0.021) −0.02* (0.011)
Modulation
Constant (reference)
  Peak hours only −0.002 (0.014) 0.034 (0.024) 0.029** (0.014)
  Peak hours top-up −0.018 (0.014) 0.041* (0.022) 0.017 (0.014)
  Distance top-up −0.081*** (0.016) −0.056** (0.024) −0.009 (0.015)
Pollution top-up −0.036** (0.014) 0.032 (0.022) 0.001 (0.014)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
  Residents 0.068*** (0.016) 0.045* (0.024) −0.014 (0.014)
  Motorbikes −0.006 (0.016) 0.010 (0.024) −0.035** (0.015)
  Frequent commuters 0.021 (0.016) 0.027 (0.024) 0.006 (0.014)
  Electric vehicles 0.012 (0.015) −0.037 (0.026) −0.05*** (0.016)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
  25% 0.01 (0.016) −0.020 (0.021) 0.004 (0.014)
  50% 0.039*** (0.015) 0.029 (0.022) 0.036** (0.014)
  75% 0.039** (0.016) 0.048** (0.021) 0.049*** (0.014)
  100% 0.054*** (0.016) 0.026 (0.023) 0.098*** (0.015)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
  Public transportation 0.087*** (0.016) 0.079*** (0.025) 0.080*** (0.015)
  Transport infrastructure 0.058*** (0.015) 0.052** (0.023) 0.044*** (0.015)
  Pollution reduction 0.066*** (0.016) 0.053** (0.024) 0.039** (0.016)
  Tunnel or bridge 0.020 (0.016) 0.038 (0.027) 0.050*** (0.016)
Number of respondents 547 235 632
Number of observations 16,407 7,047 18,954
Pseudo R2 0.0456 0.0775 0.1148
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Table 14  Estimates from 
conditional logit by commuting 
mode
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Continuous p-values are provided in Table 25
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
(1) (2)
Car and motorbike Public transporta-




 CHF 0.2 −0.043 (0.027) −0.056** (0.022)
 CHF 1 −0.140*** (0.027) −0.086*** (0.022)
 CHF 2 −0.248*** (0.026) −0.159*** (0.022)
 CHF 3 −0.321*** (0.026) −0.224*** (0.022)
 CHF 4 −0.328*** (0.026) −0.252*** (0.022)
 CHF 5 −0.388*** (0.027) −0.292*** (0.022)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
 Ring −0.018 (0.012) −0.004 (0.009)
Modulation
 Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only 0.031** (0.015) 0.010 (0.011)
 Peak hours top-up 0.014 (0.015) 0.004 (0.012)
 Distance top-up −0.012 (0.016) −0.063*** (0.012)
 Pollution top-up 0.004 (0.015) −0.017 (0.011)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
 Residents −0.006 (0.016) 0.047*** (0.012)
 Motorbikes −0.016 (0.016) −0.017 (0.013)
 Frequent commuters 0.009 (0.015) 0.018 (0.012)
 Electric vehicles −0.067*** (0.018) 0.002 (0.012)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% 0.020 (0.015) −0.007 (0.012)
 50% 0.045*** (0.015) 0.031*** (0.012)
 75% 0.061*** (0.015) 0.036*** (0.012)
 100% 0.096*** (0.016) 0.054*** (0.013)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
 Public transportation 0.061*** (0.016) 0.093*** (0.013)
 Transport infrastructure 0.033** (0.015) 0.062*** (0.012)
 Pollution reduction 0.051*** (0.015) 0.052*** (0.013)
 Tunnel or bridge 0.05*** (0.016) 0.027** (0.013)
Number of respondents 544 870
Number of observations 16,314 26,094
Pseudo R2 0.1206 0.0552
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Table 15  Estimates from conditional logit by commuting frequency
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Continuous p-values are provided in Table 26
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Inhabitants of the Canton 
of Geneva




 CHF 0.2 −0.046 (0.029) −0.103*** (0.036) −0.03 (0.026)
 CHF 1 −0.0742*** (0.029) −0.151*** (0.037) −0.119*** (0.026)
 CHF 2 −0.151*** (0.029) −0.255*** (0.036) −0.201*** (0.026)
 CHF 3 −0.214*** (0.029) −0.288*** (0.034) −0.290*** (0.026)
 CHF 4 −0.205*** (0.029) −0.322*** (0.034) −0.335*** (0.026)
 CHF 5 −0.266*** (0.028) −0.340*** (0.036) −0.383*** (0.026)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
 Ring 0.002 (0.012) 0.006 (0.015) −0.026** (0.011)
Modulation
Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only −0.008 (0.014) 0.038** (0.019) 0.031** (0.014)
 Peak hours top-up −0.01 (0.015) 0.017 (0.019) 0.02 (0.014)
 Distance top-up −0.084*** (0.016) −0.055*** (0.020) −0.004 (0.016)
 Pollution top-up −0.024* (0.015) −0.019 (0.021) 0.013 (0.014)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
 Residents 0.053*** (0.016) 0.031 (0.02) 0.003 (0.015)
 Motorbikes −0.009 (0.017) 0.013 (0.021) −0.04** (0.016)
 Frequent commuters 0.021 (0.016) 0.041** (0.021) −0.003 (0.015)
 Electric vehicles −0.011 (0.016) −0.007 (0.020) −0.043** (0.017)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% −0.001 (0.015) −0.0002 (0.020) 0.007 (0.015)
 50% 0.025 (0.015) 0.042** (0.018) 0.043*** (0.016)
 75% 0.026 (0.016) 0.065*** (0.021) 0.050*** (0.014)
 100% 0.041** (0.016) 0.045** (0.021) 0.107*** (0.015)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
 Public transportation 0.076*** (0.016) 0.106*** (0.022) 0.075*** (0.016)
 Transport infrastructure 0.045*** (0.015) 0.060*** (0.022) 0.051*** (0.015)
 Pollution reduction 0.054*** (0.016) 0.062*** (0.022) 0.044*** (0.016)
 Tunnel or bridge 0.007 (0.016) 0.054** (0.023) 0.052*** (0.017)
Number of respondents 515 314 585
Number of observations 15,444 9,414 17,550
Pseudo R2 0.0531 0.0735 0.1057
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Table 16  Estimates from 
conditional logit: cars vs. 
motorbikes
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
Continuous p-values are provided in Table 27





 CHF 0.2 − 0.022 (0.029) − 0.159** (0.069)
 CHF 1 − 0.124*** (0.028) − 0.234*** (0.072)
 CHF 2 − 0.233*** (0.028) − 0.334*** (0.065)
 CHF 3 − 0.319*** (0.028) − 0.343*** (0.069)
 CHF 4 − 0.321*** (0.029) − 0.376*** (0.064)
 CHF 5 − 0.375*** (0.029) − 0.454*** (0.068)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
 Ring − 0.02 (0.013) − 0.008 (0.032)
Modulation
Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only 0.029* (0.016) 0.05 (0.037)
 Peak hours top-up 0.013 (0.016) 0.028 (0.039)
 Distance top-up − 0.013 (0.018) 0.008 (0.039)
 Pollution top-up 0.004 (0.016) 0.013 (0.039)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
 Resident − 0.004 (0.017) − 0.008 (0.035)
 Motorbikes − 0.048*** (0.017) 0.147*** (0.037)
 Frequent commuters 0.013 (0.017) − 0.019 (0.038)
 Electric vehicles − 0.073*** (0.02) − 0.026 (0.04)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% 0.011 (0.017) 0.071* (0.04)
 50% 0.037** (0.017) 0.081** (0.04)
 75% 0.052*** (0.017) 0.098*** (0.034)
 100% 0.092*** (0.017) 0.117*** (0.038)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
 Public transportation 0.053*** (0.017) 0.101*** (0.038)
 Transport infrastruc-
ture
0.036** (0.017) 0.009 (0.042)
 Pollution reduction 0.054*** (0.016) 0.029 (0.041)







Pseudo R2 0.1285 0.1066
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Tables displaying coefficients for control variables
Table 17  The impact of informational treatments on public support, for each charge rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHF 0.2 CHF 1 CHF 2 CHF 3 CHF 4 CHF 5
Treatments
Control (reference)
 Congestion 0.015 0.022 −0.001 0.006 0.003 0.016
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
 Pollution 0.006 0.016 0.039** 0.036** 0.043*** 0.037***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Control variables
 Gender (female) −0.004 0.011 −0.004 0.014 −0.006 −0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
 Age −0.003*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.001 −0.002*** −0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.000)
 Household size 0.011** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.012***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Number of cars in household
No car (reference)
 1 car −0.023 0.008 −0.023 0.035 0.009 0.007
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
 2 cars −0.026 0.018 −0.030 0.021 −0.005 −0.009
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025)
 3 cars 0.122** 0.015 −0.029 0.025 −0.041 −0.099**
(0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
 4 cars −0.154 0.034 −0.070 −0.005 −0.049 0.102*
(0.095) (0.087) (0.084) (0.077) (0.079) (0.054)
 5 cars −0.174 −0.090 −0.210 −0.064 −0.054 0.000
(0.187) (0.184) (0.205) (0.171) (0.163) (.)
 No answer −0.079* −0.064 −0.017 0.038 −0.009 −0.003
(0.047) (0.047) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
Public transportation pass holder
No (reference)
 Yes 0.090*** 0.068*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.076*** 0.034**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
 No answer 0.098** 0.092** 0.016 0.022 0.070* 0.049
(0.046) (0.046) (0.041) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036)
Household monthly income:
< CHF 900 (reference)
 CHF 901 - CHF 1,500 0.058 −0.102 −0.026 0.046 −0.023 −0.169***
(0.067) (0.069) (0.063) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056)
 CHF 1,501 - CHF 2,000 0.128* 0.047 0.043 0.083 0.053 −0.019
(0.067) (0.065) (0.061) (0.053) (0.053) (0.042)
 CHF 2,001 - CHF 3,000 0.078 0.119** 0.109** 0.047 0.064 −0.054
(0.060) (0.057) (0.052) (0.046) (0.046) (0.039)
 CHF 3,001 - CHF 4,000 0.102* 0.062 −0.008 0.003 −0.013 −0.064*
(0.056) (0.053) (0.050) (0.044) (0.044) (0.036)
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Table 17  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHF 0.2 CHF 1 CHF 2 CHF 3 CHF 4 CHF 5
 CHF 4,001 - CHF 5,000 0.108* 0.048 −0.004 −0.019 −0.029 −0.112***
(0.055) (0.053) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.036)
 CHF 5,001 - CHF 6,000 0.124** 0.025 0.012 −0.051 −0.040 −0.187***
(0.054) (0.052) (0.048) (0.043) (0.042) (0.037)
 CHF 6,001 - CHF 7,000 0.087 −0.002 0.016 −0.022 −0.011 −0.088**
(0.056) (0.054) (0.050) (0.044) (0.043) (0.036)
 CHF 7,001 - CHF 8,000 0.119** 0.030 0.039 0.002 0.004 −0.099***
(0.057) (0.055) (0.051) (0.045) (0.044) (0.037)
 CHF 8,001 - CHF 9,000 0.051 −0.060 −0.032 −0.012 −0.009 −0.101***
(0.058) (0.056) (0.051) (0.044) (0.044) (0.037)
 CHF 9,001 - CHF 10,000 0.096* 0.053 0.036 −0.004 0.025 −0.137***
(0.058) (0.055) (0.051) (0.044) (0.044) (0.038)
 CHF 10,001 - CHF 11,000 0.056 −0.013 0.012 −0.036 0.001 −0.120***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.054) (0.048) (0.047) (0.041)
 CHF 11,001 - CHF 12,000 0.073 −0.076 −0.034 −0.045 −0.042 −0.143***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.058) (0.051) (0.050) (0.042)
 > CHF 12,000 0.154*** 0.018 −0.009 −0.034 −0.016 −0.133***
(0.054) (0.052) (0.049) (0.043) (0.042) (0.035)
 No answer 0.110** 0.010 −0.005 −0.075* −0.028 −0.134***
(0.050) (0.047) (0.044) (0.039) (0.038) (0.031)
Education level
Compulsory schooling (reference)
Apprenticeship 0.005 0.013 −0.023 −0.014 −0.060** −0.018
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024)
 Post-compulsory school 0.054* 0.014 0.000 −0.009 −0.059** −0.006
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023)
 Superior first cycle degree 0.031 0.003 0.008 −0.012 −0.062** 0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027)
 Superior second cycle degree 0.002 −0.007 −0.014 0.012 −0.040* 0.015
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
 No answer −0.406*** −0.255*** −0.090 0.057 0.057 0.084*
(0.114) (0.095) (0.072) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050)
Residence area
Canton of Geneva (reference)
 Canton of Vaud −0.104*** −0.068*** −0.009 0.015 −0.018 0.012
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
 Genevois 0.137*** 0.062* −0.030 −0.041 −0.102*** −0.104***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.036)
 Gex 0.069*** 0.033 −0.034 −0.061*** −0.065*** −0.061***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
 Haute-Savoie 0.263*** 0.162*** 0.009 −0.073* −0.209*** −0.144***
(0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.057) (0.048)
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Table 17  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHF 0.2 CHF 1 CHF 2 CHF 3 CHF 4 CHF 5
 Annemasse agglomeration 0.137*** 0.062** 0.009 −0.024 −0.041* −0.036*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
Commuting
Car (reference)
 Bus and tramway −0.065*** 0.027 0.044** 0.060*** −0.007 0.033*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
 Train 0.012 0.046 0.022 0.013 −0.023 −0.007
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
 Motorcycle −0.027 0.001 −0.010 0.069** 0.020 0.011
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
 Bicycle −0.017 −0.048 0.065* 0.053 0.048 0.090***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027)
 Walking −0.072* 0.031 0.070** 0.061** 0.015 0.009
(0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
 No answer −0.022 0.034 0.020 0.029 −0.014 −0.007
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Number of respondents 1414 1414 1414 1414 1414 1414
Number of observations 4,736 4,711 4,702 4,702 4,711 4,702
R
2 0.0432 0.0265 0.0202 0.0290 0.0412 0.0462
Estimates report average marginal effects from logit with control variables
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
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Table 18  The impact of informational treatments on public support, for each modulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant Peak hours only Peak hours top-up Distance top-up Pollution top-up
Treatments
Control (reference)
 Congestion 0.020 −0.005 0.005 0.026* 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
 Pollution 0.018 0.021 0.047*** 0.021 0.045***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Control variables
 Gender (female) −0.012 0.014 −0.015 0.011 0.010
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
 Age −0.001*** −0.002*** −0.001*** −0.001** −0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
 Household size 0.013*** 0.009** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of cars in household
No car (reference)
 1 car 0.007 0.024 −0.031 −0.005 0.013
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
 2 cars −0.038 0.037 −0.030 −0.010 0.015
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
 3 cars −0.014 −0.012 0.004 −0.004 0.038
(0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
 4 cars 0.022 −0.121 −0.021 0.041 −0.052
(0.069) (0.090) (0.072) (0.072) (0.077)
 5 cars −0.006 0.107 0.000 0.000 −0.211
(0.130) (0.144) (.) (.) (0.202)
 No answer −0.055 −0.030 −0.003 −0.029 0.001
(0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039)
Public transportation pass holder
No (reference)
 Yes 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.047*** 0.061***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
 No answer 0.116*** 0.057 0.009 0.062* 0.054
(0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
Household monthly income
 < CHF 900 (refer-
ence)
 CHF 901 - CHF 
1,500
−0.046 0.060 −0.072 −0.003 −0.138**
(0.055) (0.059) (0.059) (0.053) (0.061)
 CHF 1,501 - CHF 
2,000
0.046 0.124** 0.071 −0.009 0.027
(0.054) (0.058) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
 CHF 2,001 - CHF 
3,000
0.048 0.147*** 0.032 −0.001 0.059
(0.047) (0.051) (0.048) (0.045) (0.047)
 CHF 3,001 - CHF 
4,000
−0.018 0.084* −0.000 −0.033 0.008
(0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045)
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Table 18  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant Peak hours only Peak hours top-up Distance top-up Pollution top-up
 CHF 4,001 - CHF 
5,000
−0.032 0.063 0.004 −0.036 −0.035
(0.044) (0.048) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044)
 CHF 5,001 - CHF 
6,000
−0.060 0.063 −0.055 −0.017 −0.040
(0.043) (0.047) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
 CHF 6,001 - CHF 
7,000
−0.066 0.104** −0.022 −0.026 −0.036
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045)
 CHF 7,001 - CHF 
8,000
−0.020 0.120** 0.021 −0.080* 0.010
(0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
 CHF 8,001 - CHF 
9,000
−0.025 0.058 −0.050 −0.102** −0.048
(0.045) (0.050) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
 CHF 9,001 - CHF 
10,000
−0.020 0.096* 0.016 −0.063 −0.005
(0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
 CHF 10,001 - CHF 
11,000
−0.023 0.046 −0.020 −0.061 −0.066
(0.048) (0.053) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050)
 CHF 11,001 - CHF 
12,000
−0.096* 0.017 −0.048 −0.057 −0.062
(0.052) (0.056) (0.052) (0.049) (0.051)
 > CHF 12,000 −0.030 0.071 −0.018 −0.052 −0.020
(0.043) (0.048) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044)
 No answer −0.053 0.051 −0.047 −0.046 −0.036
(0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040)
Education level
Compulsory schooling (reference)
 Apprenticeship −0.004 −0.035 −0.031 −0.038 0.021
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028)
 Post-compulsory 
school
0.001 −0.020 −0.008 −0.020 0.035
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)
 Superior first cycle 
degree
−0.032 0.006 −0.046 0.006 0.031
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031)
 Superior second 
cycle degree
−0.009 −0.028 −0.022 −0.009 0.034
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)
 No answer −0.052 −0.199** −0.061 −0.000 −0.010
(0.064) (0.079) (0.066) (0.059) (0.061)
Residence area
Canton of Geneva (reference)
 Canton of Vaud −0.067*** −0.024 −0.032 0.024 −0.048**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
 Genevois −0.033 −0.015 0.019 0.006 −0.003
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
 Gex −0.029 −0.057*** −0.016 −0.001 0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
 Haute-Savoie 0.040 0.073** 0.027 −0.003 0.017
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036)
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Table 18  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant Peak hours only Peak hours top-up Distance top-up Pollution top-up
 Annemasse 
agglomeration
0.025 0.040* 0.001 0.041** −0.014
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Commuting
Car (reference)
 Bus and tramway 0.015 0.009 0.018 0.019 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
 Train 0.055* −0.010 0.011 −0.039 0.022
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
 Motorcycle −0.006 0.015 −0.011 0.023 0.009
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028)
 Bicycle 0.068** 0.100*** 0.037 −0.026 −0.010
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
 Walking 0.006 0.020 0.047 −0.009 0.029
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
 No answer 0.008 0.023 −0.001 −0.011 0.003
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Number of respond-
ents
1414 1414 1414 1414 1414
Number of observa-
tions
5’638 5’678 5’638 5’651 5’651
R
2 0.0226 0.0224 0.0187 0.0131 0.0204
Estimates report average marginal effects from logit with control variables
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
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Table 21  Estimates from conditional logit with p-values
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
p-values in parentheses
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Potential voters Non-voters
Charge rate
CHF 0 (reference)
 CHF 0.2 −0.051*** (0.002) −0.065*** (0.005) −0.034 (0.167)
 CHF 1 −0.109*** (0.000) −0.099*** (0.000) −0.119*** (0.000)
 CHF 2 −0.195*** (0.000) −0.173*** (0.000) −0.22*** (0.000)
 CHF 3 −0.262*** (0.000) −0.232*** (0.000) −0.296*** (0.000)
 CHF 4 −0.283*** (0.000) −0.239*** (0.000) −0.34*** (0.000)
 CHF 5 −0.33*** (0.000) −0.291*** (0.000) −0.375*** (0.000)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
 Ring −0.008 (0.263) 0.0001 (0.989) −0.02* (0.072)
Modulation
Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only 0.018** (0.042) 0.009 (0.458) 0.029** (0.032)
 Peak hours top-up 0.008 (0.395) −0.0003 (0.983) 0.017 (0.205)
 Distance top-up −0.045*** (0.000) −0.073*** (0.000) −0.009 (0.542)
 Pollution top-up −0.008 (0.353) −0.016 (0.193) 0.001 (0.945)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% 0.002 (0.839) 0.0004 (0.976) 0.004 (0.756)
 50% 0.036*** (0.000) 0.036*** (0.004) 0.036** (0.012)
 75% 0.044*** (0.000) 0.041*** (0.002) 0.049*** (0.000)
 100% 0.069*** (0.000) 0.046*** (0.000) 0.098*** (0.000)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
 Residents 0.029*** (0.003) 0.060*** (0.000) −0.014 (0.315)
 Motorbikes −0.015 (0.131) −0.001 (0.923) −0.035** (0.019)
 Frequent commuters 0.016* (0.097) 0.022* (0.085) 0.006 (0.653)
 Electric vehicles −0.023** (0.022) −0.003 (0.834) −0.05*** (0.002)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee(reference)
 Public transportation 0.082*** (0.000) 0.084*** (0.000) 0.080*** (0.000)
 Transport infrastructure 0.050*** (0.000) 0.056*** (0.000) 0.044*** (0.003)
 Pollution reduction 0.051*** (0.000) 0.062*** (0.000) 0.039** (0.011)
 Tunnel or bridge 0.035*** (0.001) 0.025* (0.067) 0.05*** (0.001)
Number of respondents 1,414 782 632
Number of observations 42,408 23,454 18,954
Pseudo R2 0.0748 0.0523 0.1148
Tables with p‑values
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Table 22  The impact of informational treatments on public support, for each charge rate with p-values
Estimates report average marginal effects from logit
p-values in parentheses
** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHF 0.2 CHF 1 CHF 2 CHF 3 CHF 4 CHF 5
Congestion 0.020 0.020 −0.003 0.002 −0.001 0.012
(0.243) (0.246) (0.838) (0.898) (0.950) (0.383)
Pollution 0.002 0.012 0.042** 0.037** 0.042*** 0.038***
(0.921) (0.476) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of respondents 1414 1414 1414 1414 1414 1414
Number of observations 4,736 4,711 4,702 4,702 4,711 4,710
R
2 0.0003 0.0002 0.0019 0.0017 0.0027 0.0021
Table 23  The impact of informational treatments on public support, for each modulation with p-values
Estimates report average marginal effects from logit
p-values in parentheses
*** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant Peak hours only Peak hours top-up Distance top-up Pollution top-up
Congestion 0.019 −0.007 0.001 0.025 0.006
(0.184) (0.617) (0.962) (0.068) (0.696)
Pollution 0.018 0.017 0.046*** 0.022 0.045***
(0.213) (0.234) (0.001) (0.105) (0.002)
Number of respond-
ents
1414 1414 1414 1414 1414
Number of observa-
tions
5’638 5’678 5’646 5’659 5’651
R
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.002 0.0007 0.0018
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Table 24  Estimates from conditional logit with p-values: residents of the perimeter, living in the Canton of 
Geneva but outside the perimeters, not living in the Canton of Geneva
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
p-values in parentheses
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Residents Living in the Canton of 
Geneva but outside the 
perimeters




 CHF 0.2 −0.053* (0.059) −0.088** (0.037) −0.034 (0.167)
 CHF 1 −0.072** (0.012) −0.150*** (0.000) −0.119*** (0.000)
 CHF 2 −0.144*** (0.000) −0.231*** (0.000) −0.220*** (0.000)
 CHF 3 −0.215*** (0.000) −0.264*** (0.000) −0.296*** (0.000)
 CHF 4 −0.210*** (0.000) −0.302*** (0.000) −0.340*** (0.000)
 CHF 5 −0.268*** (0.000) −0.336*** (0.000) −0.375*** (0.000)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
 Ring −0.005 (0.680) −0.008 (0.685) −0.02* (0.072)
Modulation
Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only −0.002 (0.898) 0.034 (0.156) 0.029** (0.032)
 Peak hours top-up −0.018 (0.212) 0.041* (0.065) 0.017 (0.205)
 Distance top-up −0.081*** (0.000) −0.056** (0.017) −0.009 (0.542)
 Pollution top-up −0.036** (0.011) 0.032 (0.140) 0.001 (0.945)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
 Residents 0.068*** (0.000) 0.045* (0.059) −0.014 (0.315)
 Motorbikes −0.006 (0.712) 0.010 (0.676) −0.035** (0.019)
 Frequent commuters 0.021 (0.183) 0.027 (0.272) 0.006 (0.653)
 Electric vehicles 0.012 (0.453) −0.037 (0.158) −0.05*** (0.002)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% 0.01 (0.545) −0.020 (0.344) 0.004 (0.756)
 50% 0.039*** (0.010) 0.029 (0.184) 0.036** (0.012)
 75% 0.039** (0.016) 0.048** (0.021) 0.049*** (0.000)
 100% 0.054*** (0.001) 0.026 (0.255) 0.098*** (0.000)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
 Public transportation 0.087*** (0.000) 0.079*** (0.001) 0.080*** (0.000)
 Transport infrastructure 0.058*** (0.000) 0.052** (0.025) 0.044*** (0.003)
 Pollution reduction 0.066*** (0.000) 0.053** (0.026) 0.039** (0.011)
 Tunnel or bridge 0.020 (0.208) 0.038 (0.152) 0.050*** (0.001)
Number of respondents 547 235 632
Number of observations 16,407 7,047 18,954
Pseudo R2 0.0456 0.0775 0.1148
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Table 25  Estimates from 
conditional logit by commuting 
mode with p-values
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
p-values in parentheses
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
(1) (2)
Car and motorbike Public transporta-




 CHF 0.2 −0.043 (0.110) −0.056** (0.010)
 CHF 1 −0.140*** (0.000) −0.086*** (0.000)
 CHF 2 −0.248*** (0.000) −0.159*** (0.000)
 CHF 3 −0.321*** (0.000) −0.224*** (0.000)
 CHF 4 −0.328*** (0.000) −0.252*** (0.000)
 CHF 5 −0.388*** (0.027) −0.292*** (0.000)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
 Ring −0.018 (0.138) −0.004 (0.693)
Modulation
Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only 0.031** (0.041) 0.010 (0.352)
 Peak hours top-up 0.014 (0.346) 0.004 (0.719)
 Distance top-up −0.012 (0.456) −0.063*** (0.000)
 Pollution top-up 0.004 (0.789) −0.017 (0.142)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
 Residents −0.006 (0.723) 0.047*** (0.000)
 Motorbikes −0.016 (0.334) −0.017 (0.193)
 Frequent commuters 0.009 (0.559) 0.018 (0.132)
 Electric vehicles −0.067*** (0.000) 0.002 (0.896)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% 0.020 (0.190) −0.007 (0.537)
 50% 0.045*** (0.004) 0.031*** (0.009)
 75% 0.061*** (0.000) 0.036*** (0.003)
 100% 0.096*** (0.000) 0.054*** (0.000)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
 Public transportation 0.061*** (0.000) 0.093*** (0.000)
 Transport infrastructure 0.033** (0.035) 0.062*** (0.000)
 Pollution reduction 0.051*** (0.001) 0.052*** (0.000)
 Tunnel or bridge 0.05*** (0.002) 0.027** (0.042)
Number of respondents 544 870
Number of observations 16,314 26,094
Pseudo R2 0.1206 0.0552
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Table 26  Estimates from conditional logit by commuting frequency with p-values
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
p-values in parentheses
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Inhabitants of the Canton 
of Geneva




 CHF 0.2 −0.046 (0.104) −0.103*** (0.005) −0.03 (0.246)
 CHF 1 −0.0742*** (0.009) −0.151*** (0.000) −0.119*** (0.000)
 CHF 2 −0.151*** (0.000) −0.255*** (0.000) −0.201*** (0.000)
 CHF 3 −0.214*** (0.000) −0.288*** (0.000) −0.290*** (0.000)
 CHF 4 −0.205*** (0.000) −0.322*** (0.000) −0.335*** (0.000)
 CHF 5 −0.266*** (0.000) −0.340*** (0.000) −0.383*** (0.000)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
 Ring 0.002 (0.861) 0.006 (0.696) −0.026** (0.019)
Modulation
Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only −0.008 (0.582) 0.038** (0.048) 0.031** (0.032)
 Peak hours top-up −0.01 (0.506) 0.017 (0.388) 0.02 (0.162)
 Distance top-up −0.084*** (0.000) −0.055*** (0.008) −0.004 (0.804)
 Pollution top-up −0.024* (0.099) −0.019 (0.364) 0.013 (0.331)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
Residents 0.053*** (0.001) 0.031 (0.117) 0.003 (0.820)
 Motorbikes −0.009 (0.604) 0.013 (0.533) −0.04** (0.010)
 Frequent commuters 0.021 (0.192) 0.041** (0.048) −0.003 (0.826)
 Electric vehicles −0.011 (0.501) −0.007 (0.732) −0.043** (0.010)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% −0.001 (0.958) −0.0002 (0.990) 0.007 (0.628)
 50% 0.025 (0.108) 0.042** (0.023) 0.043*** (0.005)
 75% 0.026 (0.110) 0.065*** (0.002) 0.050*** (0.000)
 100% 0.041** (0.011) 0.045** (0.030) 0.107*** (0.000)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
 Public transportation 0.076*** (0.000) 0.106*** (0.000) 0.075*** (0.000)
 Transport infrastructure 0.045*** (0.003) 0.060*** (0.007) 0.051*** (0.001)
 Pollution reduction 0.054*** (0.001) 0.062*** (0.005) 0.044*** (0.007)
 Tunnel or bridge 0.007 (0.688) 0.054** (0.018) 0.052*** (0.002)
Number of respondents 515 314 585
Number of observations 15,444 9,414 17,550
Pseudo R2 0.0531 0.0735 0.1057
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Table 27  Estimates from 
conditional logit with p-values: 
cars vs. motorbikes
Estimates report average marginal effects from conditional logit
p-values in parentheses





 CHF 0.2 −0.022 (0.445) −0.159** (0.021)
 CHF 1 −0.124*** (0.000) −0.234*** (0.001)
 CHF 2 −0.233*** (0.000) −0.334*** (0.000)
 CHF 3 −0.319*** (0.000) −0.343*** (0.000)
 CHF 4 −0.321*** (0.000) −0.376*** (0.000)
 CHF 5 −0.375*** (0.000) −0.454*** (0.000)
Perimeter
Center (reference)
Ring −0.02 (0.117) −0.008 (0.794)
 Modulation
Constant (reference)
 Peak hours only 0.029* (0.081) 0.05 (0.174)
 Peak hours top-up 0.013 (0.422) 0.028 (0.463)
 Distance top-up −0.013 (0.448) 0.008 (0.838)
 Pollution top-up 0.004 (0.820) 0.013 (0.733)
Beneficiaries
Business deliveries (reference)
 Resident −0.004 (0.796) −0.008 (0.808)
 Motorbikes −0.048*** (0.006) 0.147*** (0.000)
 Frequent commuters 0.013 (0.446) −0.019 (0.614)
 Electric vehicles −0.073*** (0.000) −0.026 (0.514)
Exemption level
0% (reference)
 25% 0.011 (0.503) 0.071* (0.075)
 50% 0.037** (0.025) 0.081** (0.040)
 75% 0.052*** (0.002) 0.098*** (0.004)
 100% 0.092*** (0.000) 0.117*** (0.002)
Use of revenue
Vehicle registration fee (reference)
 Public transportation 0.053*** (0.002) 0.101*** (0.007)
 Transport infrastructure 0.036** (0.031) 0.009 (0.828)
 Pollution reduction 0.054*** (0.001) 0.029 (0.477)
 Tunnel or bridge 0.045** (0.011) 0.085** (0.047)
Number of respondents 465 79
Number of observations 13,944 2,370
Pseudo R2 0.1285 0.1066






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 A. Baranzini et al.
1 3
Funding Open Access funding provided by Haute Ecole Specialisée de Suisse occidentale (HES-SO).
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly 
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Agarwal S, Koo KM (2016) Impact of electronic road pricing (ERP) changes on transport modal choice. 
Region Sci Urban Econ 60:1–11
Allen S, Gaunt M, Rye T (2006) An investigation into the reasons for the rejection of congestion charging 
by the citizens of Edinburgh. Eur Transp 32:95–113
Andersson D, Nässén J (2016) The Gothenburg congestion charge scheme: A pre-post analysis of commut-
ing behavior and travel satisfaction. J Transp Geogr 52:82–89
ARE (2016) Coûts et bénéfices externes de transports en Suisse. Transports par la route et le rail, par avion 
et par bateau de 2010 à 2013. Technical report, Office fédéral du développement territorial ARE, Bern
ARE (2018) Parts modales dans les agglomérations: Résultats 2015. Technical report, Office fédéral du 
développement territorial ARE, Bern
Arnott R, de Palma A, Lindsey C (1993) A structural model of peak-period congestion: A traffic bottleneck 
with elastic demand. Am Econ Rev 83(1):161–79
Austin W, Carattini S, Gómez Mahecha J, Pesko M (2020) COVID-19 mortality and contemporaneous air 
pollution. Technical Report 352, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environ-
ment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy
Baranzini A, Borzykowski N, Carattini S (2018a) Carbon offsets out of the woods? Acceptability of domes-
tic vs. international reforestation programmes in the lab. J For Econ 32:1–12
Baranzini A, Carattini S (2017) Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon 
taxes with survey data. Environ Econ Policy Stud 19(1):197–227
Baranzini A, Ferro Luzzi G, Maradan D (2017) Plan climat cantonal. République et Canton de Genève, Ser-
vice cantonal du développement durable. Unpublished document
Baranzini A, Schaerer C, Emad S, (2018b) Grand Genève: sa population et son désir de vivre ensemble. 
Enquête, (2018) Cahier de recherche. HES-SO Genève, Genève
Bento A, Roth K, Waxman AR (2020) Avoiding traffic congestion externalities? The value of urgency. 
Working Paper 26956, National Bureau of Economic Research
Berman JD, Ebisu K (2020) Changes in U.S. air pollution during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sci Total Envi-
ron 739:139864
Bharadwaj P, Gibson M, Zivin JG, Neilson C (2017) Gray matters: fetal pollution exposure and human capi-
tal formation. J Assoc Environ Resource Econ 4(2):505–542
Börjesson M, Eliasson J, Hugosson MB, Brundell-Freij K (2012) The Stockholm congestion charges–5 
years on. Effects, acceptability and lessons learnt. Transp Policy 20:1–12
Börjesson M, Kristoffersson I (2015) The Gothenburg congestion charge: Effects, design and politics. 
Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract 75:1
Brännlund R, Persson L (2012) To tax, or not to tax: Preferences for climate policy attributes. Clim Policy 
12:704–721
Carattini S, Baranzini A, Lalive R (2018a) Is taxing waste a waste of time? Evidence from a Supreme Court 
decision. Ecol Econ 148:131–151
Carattini S, Baranzini A, Thalmann P, Varone F, Vöhringer F (2017) Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are 
millions of nays inevitable? Environ Resource Econ 68(1):97–128
Carattini S, Carvalho M, Fankhauser S (2018b) Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes. Wiley Inter-
discip Rev: Clim Change 9(5):e531
Carattini S, Kallbekken S, Orlov A (2019) How to win public support for a global carbon tax. Nature 
565(7739):289–291
Cherry TL, Kallbekken S, Kroll S (2014) The impact of trial runs on the acceptability of environmental 
taxes: experimental evidence. Resour Energy Econ 38:84–95
Designing Effective and Acceptable Road Pricing Schemes
1 3
Cicala S, Holland SP, Mansur ET, Muller NZ, Yates AJ (2020) Expected health effects of reduced air pol-
lution from COVID-19 social distancing. Technical Report 27135, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc
Coria J, Bonilla J, Grundström M, Pleijel H (2015) Air pollution dynamics and the need for temporally dif-
ferentiated road pricing. Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract 75:178–195
Corvec SS-L, Raux C, Eliasson J, Hamilton C, Brundell-Freij K, Kiiskilä K, Tervonen J (2016) Predicting 
the results of a referendum on urban road pricing in France: “The cry of Cassandra’’? Eur Transp Res 
Rev 8(2):15
Croci E (2016) Urban road pricing: A comparative study on the experiences of London, Stockholm and 
Milan. Transp Rese Procedia 14:253–262
Croci E, Douvan AR (2015) Urban road pricing: the experience of Milan. In: Carbon pricing - design, expe-
riences and issues, law 2015. Edward Elgar Publishing, pp 141–158
Currie J, Graff Zivin J, Mullins J, Neidell M (2014) What do we know about short- and long-term effects of 
early-life exposure to pollution? Ann Rev Resource Econ 6(1):217–247
Currie J, Walker R (2011) Traffic congestion and infant health: Evidence from E-ZPass. Am Econ J: Appl 
Econ 3(1):65–90
Dal Bó E, Dal Bó P, Eyster E (2018) The demand for bad policy when voters underappreciate equilibrium 
effects. Rev Econ Stud 85(2):964–998
De Borger B, Proost S (2012) A political economy model of road pricing. J Urban Econ 71(1):79–92
DETA (2014) Les transports genevois en chiffres. Technical report, Département de l’environnement, des 
transports et de l’agriculture DETA, Genève
Dixit A, Grossman GM, Helpman E (1997) Common agency and coordination: General theory and applica-
tion to government policy making. J Polit Econ 105(4):752–769
Downs A (1957) An economic theory of political action in a democracy. J Polit Econ 65(2):135–150
Drechsel D, Funk AK (2017) Time-varying and regional dynamics in Swiss housing markets. Swiss J Econ 
Stat 153(1):37–72
Dresner S, Dunne L, Clinch P, Beuermann C (2006) Social and political responses to ecological tax reform 
in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy 34(8):895–904
Ecoplan/Infras (2014) Externe Effekte des Verkehrs 2010, Monetarisierung von Umwelt-. Unfall- und 
Gesundheitseffekten, Schlussbericht, Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung ARE, Bern, Zürich und 
Altdorf
Ecoplan/Infras (2018) Externe Effekte des Verkehrs 2015, Aktualisierung der Berechnungen von Umwelt-, 
Unfall- und Gesundheitseffekten des Strassen-, Schienen-, Luft- und Schiffsverkehrs 2010 bis 2015. 
Schlussbericht, Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung ARE, Bern
Eliasson J (2014) The Stockholm congestion charges: An overview. Working papers in Transport Econom-
ics 2014:7, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI)
Eliasson J, Hultkrantz L, Nerhagen L, Rosqvist LS (2009) The Stockholm congestion—charging trial 2006: 
overview of effects. Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract 43(3):240–250
Eliasson J, Jonsson L (2011) The unexpected “yes’’: Explanatory factors behind the positive attitudes to 
congestion charges in Stockholm. Transp Policy 18(4):636–647
Eliasson J, Mattsson L-G (2006) Equity effects of congestion pricing: quantitative methodology and a case 
study for Stockholm. Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract 40(7):602–620
Ferejohn J (1986) Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 50(1/3):5–25
Gevrek Z, Uyduranoglu A (2015) Public preferences for carbon tax attributes. Ecol Econ 118:186–197
Gibson M, Carnovale M (2015) The effects of road pricing on driver behavior and air pollution. J Urban 
Econ 89:62–73
Goh M (2002) Congestion management and electronic road pricing in Singapore. J Transp Geogr 
10(1):29–38
Green CP, Heywood JS, Navarro M (2016) Traffic accidents and the London congestion charge. J Public 
Econ 133:11–22
Grisolía JM, López F, Ortúzar JdD (2015) Increasing the acceptability of a congestion charging scheme. 
Transp Policy 39:37–47
Gu Z, Liu Z, Cheng Q, Saberi M (2018) Congestion pricing practices and public acceptance: A review of 
evidence. Case Stud Transp Policy 6:1
Hahn RW (1989) Economic prescriptions for environmental problems: How the patient followed the doc-
tor’s orders. J Econ Perspect 3(2):95–114
Hanley N, Wright R, Mourato S (2001) Choice modelling approaches: A superior alternative for environ-
mental valuation? J Econ Surv 15:435–62
 A. Baranzini et al.
1 3
Hansla A, Hysing E, Nilsson A, Martinsson J (2017) Explaining voting behavior in the Gothenburg conges-
tion tax referendum. Transp Policy 53:98–106
Harrison GW (2006) Making choice studies incentive compatible. Valuing environmental amenities using 
stated choice studies, the economics of non-market goods and resources. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 
67–110
Harrison GW, List JA (2004) Field experiments. J Econ Lit 42(4):1009–1055
Hau TD (1990) Electronic road pricing: Developments in Hong Kong 1983–1989. J Transp Econ Policy 
24(2):203–214
He G, Pan Y, Tanaka T (2020) The short-term impacts of COVID-19 lockdown on urban air pollution in 
China. Nature Sustainability
Hensher DA, Li Z (2013) Referendum voting in road pricing reform: A review of the evidence. Transp 
Policy 25:186–197
Hensher DA, Rose JM, Collins AT (2013) Understanding buy-in for risky prospects: incorporating degree 
of belief into the ex-ante assessment of support for alternative road pricing schemes. J Transp Econ 
Policy 47(3):453–473
Ieromonachou P, Potter S, Warren JP (2006) Norway’s urban toll rings: Evolving towards congestion charg-
ing? Transp Policy 13(5):367–378
Ison S, Rye T (2005) Implementing road user charging: The lessons learnt from Hong Kong, Cambridge and 
Central London. Transp Rev 25(4):451–465
Jacobsen MR (2013) Fuel economy and safety: the influences of vehicle class and driver behavior. Am Econ 
J: Appl Econ 5(3):1–26
Jaensirisak S, Wardman M, May AD (2005) Explaining variations in public acceptability of road pricing 
schemes. J Transp Econ Policy 39(2):127–153
Janusch N, Kroll S, Goemans C, Cherry TL, Kallbekken S (2020) Learning to accept welfare-enhancing 
policies: an experimental investigation of congestion pricing. Exp Econ
Kallbekken S, Aasen M (2010) The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecol Econ 
69(11):2183–2190
Kallbekken S, Kroll S, Cherry TL (2011) Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aver-
sion and revenue recycling in the lab. J Environ Econ Manag 62(1):53–64
Kaplowitz SA, McCright AM (2015) Effects of policy characteristics and justifications on acceptance of a 
gasoline tax increase. Energy Policy 87:370–381
Keller M, Wüthrich P (2016) Neuberechnung Staukosten Schweiz 2010–2014. Schlussbericht, Bundesamt 
für Raumentwicklung ARE, Bern
Khan AM (2001) Reducing traffic density: the experience of Hong Kong and Singapore. J Urban Technol 
8(1):69–87
Knittel CR, Miller DL, Sanders NJ (2016) Caution, drivers! Children present: traffic, pollution, and infant 
health. Rev Econ Stat 98(2):350–366
Kottenhoff K, Brundell Freij K (2009) The role of public transport for feasibility and acceptability of con-
gestion charging—the case of Stockholm. Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract 43(3):297–305
Kramer GH (1983) The ecological fallacy revisited: Aggregate- versus individual-level findings on econom-
ics and elections, and sociotropic voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 77(1):92–111
Krishnamurthy CKB, Ngo NS (2020) The effects of smart-parking on transit and traffic: Evidence from 
SFpark. J Environ Econ Manag 99:102273
Kristoffersson I, Engelson L, Börjesson M (2017) Efficiency vs equity: Conflicting objectives of congestion 
charges. Transp Policy 60(C):99–107
Lavy V, Ebenstein A, Roth S (2014) The impact of short term exposure to ambient air pollution on cogni-
tive performance and human capital formation. Working Paper 20648, National Bureau of Economic 
Research
Leape J (2006) The London congestion charge. J Econ Perspect 20:157–176
Li H, Graham DJ, Majumdar A (2012) The effects of congestion charging on road traffic casualties: A causal 
analysis using difference-in-difference estimation. Accid Anal Prev 49:366–377
Li Z, Hensher DA (2010) Toll roads in Australia: An overview of characteristics and accuracy of demand 
forecasts. Transp Rev 30(5):541–569
Litra (2017) Verkehrszahlen - Ausgabe 2017. Technical report, Bern
Maibach M, Schreyer C, Sutter D, Essen V, P, H, Boon BH, Smokers R, Schroten A, Doll C, Pawlowska B, 
Bak M (2007) Handbook on estimation of external cost in the transport sector—produced within the 
study internalisation measures and policies for all external cost of transport (IMPACT). Technical 
report, Delft
Maskin E, Tirole J (2004) The politician and the judge: Accountability in government. Am Econ Rev 
94(4):1034–1054
Designing Effective and Acceptable Road Pricing Schemes
1 3
McFadden DL (1973) Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. Frontiers in Econometrics. 
Wiley, New York, pp 105–142
Muhammad S, Long X, Salman M (2020) COVID-19 pandemic and environmental pollution: A blessing in 
disguise? Sci Total Environ 728:138820
Odeck J, Bråthen S (2002) Toll financing in Norway: the success, the failures and perspectives for the 
future. Transp Policy 9(3):253–260
OECD/ITF (2017) ITF Transport Outlook 2017. Technical report, OECD Publishing, Paris
OFS (2017) Transport transalpin et transfrontalier de personnes. Technical report, Office fédéral de la statis-
tique OFS, Neuchâtel
Parry IWH (2002) Comparing the efficiency of alternative policies for reducing traffic congestion. J Publ 
Econ 85(3):333–362
Parry IWH, Bento A (2002) Estimating the welfare effect of congestion taxes: The critical importance of 
other distortions within the transport system. J Urban Econ 51(2):339–365
Percoco M (2013) Is road pricing effective in abating pollution? Evidence from Milan. Transp Res Part D: 
Transp Environ 25:112–118
Percoco M (2014) The effect of road pricing on traffic composition: Evidence from a natural experiment in 
Milan, Italy. Transp Policy 31:55–60
Pigou AC (1920) The economics of welfare. Macmillan, London
Ramjerdi F, Minken H, Østmoe K (2004) 10. Norwegian urban tolls. Res Transp Econ 9(1):237–249
Reed Johnson F, Lancsar E, Marshall D, Kilambi V, Mühlbacher A, Regier DA, Bresnahan BW, Kanninen 
B, Bridges JFP (2013) Constructing experimental designs for discrete-choice experiments: Report of 
the ISPOR conjoint analysis experimental design good research practices task force. Value in Health 
16(1):3–13
Reynolds DJ (1963) Congestion. J Ind Econ 11(2):132–140
Rhodes E, Axsen J, Jaccard M (2014) Does effective climate policy require well-informed citizen support? 
Glob Environ Change 29:92–104
Samuelson W, Zeckhauser R (1988) Status quo bias in decision making. J Risk Uncert 1(1):7–59
Schade J, Baum M (2007) Reactance or acceptance? Reactions towards the introduction of road pricing. 
Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract 41(1):41–48
Schaller B (2010) New York City’s congestion pricing experience and implications for road pricing accept-
ance in the United States. Transp Policy 17(4):266–273
Schuitema G, Steg L, Forward S (2010) Explaining differences in acceptability before and acceptance 
after the implementation of a congestion charge in Stockholm. Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract 
44(2):99–109
Shefer D, Rietveld P (1997) Congestion and safety on highways: Towards an analytical model. Urban Stud 
34(4):679–692
Simeonova E, Currie J, Nilsson P, Walker R (2018) Congestion pricing, air pollution and children’s health. 
Working Paper 24410, National Bureau of Economic Research
Sælen H, Kallbekken S (2011) A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway. Ecol Econ 
70(11):2181–2190
Small KA, Verhoef ET, Lindsey R (2007) The Economics of Urban Transportation, 2nd edn. Routledge
Small KA, Winston C, Yan J (2005) Uncovering the distribution of motorists’ preferences for travel time 
and reliability. Econometrica 73(4):1367–1382
Steg L, Dreijerink L, Abrahamse W (2006) Why are energy policies acceptable and effective? Environ 
Behav 38(1):92–111
Tang CK (2016) Traffic externalities and housing prices: Evidence from the London congestion charge. 
SERC Discussion Papers 0205, Spatial Economics Research Centre, LSE
Ubbels B, Verhoef ET (2006) Acceptability of road pricing and revenue use in the Netherlands. Eur Transp 
32:69–94
United Nations (2015) World urbanization prospects: The 2014 Revision. Technical report, United Nations, 
New York
Vickrey WS (1963) Pricing in urban and suburban transport. Am Econ Rev 53(2):452–465
Walters AA (1961) The theory and measurement of private and social cost of highway congestion. Econo-
metrica 29(4):676–699
Wang C, Quddus MA, Ison SG (2009) Impact of traffic congestion on road accidents: A spatial analysis of 
the M25 motorway in England. Accid Anal Prev 41(4):798–808
Winslott-Hiselius L, Brundell-Freij K, Vagland s, Byström C (2009) The development of public attitudes 
towards the Stockholm congestion trial. Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract 43(3):269–282
World Bank (2020) State and trends of carbon pricing - 2020. Technical report, Washington, DC
 A. Baranzini et al.
1 3
Yang J, Purevjav A-O, Li S (2020) The marginal cost of traffic congestion and road pricing: Evidence from a 
natural experiment in Beijing. Am Econ J: Econ Policy 12(1):418–453
Zhang X, Zhang X, Chen X (2017) Happiness in the air: How does a dirty sky affect mental health and sub-
jective well-being? J Environ Econ Manag 85:81–94
Zhong N, Cao J, Wang Y (2017) Traffic congestion, ambient air pollution, and health: Evidence from driv-
ing restrictions in Beijing. J Assoc Environ Resource Econ 4(3):821–856
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and 
institutional affiliations
Authors and Affiliations
Andrea Baranzini1  · Stefano Carattini2,3,4,5  · Linda Tesauro1,6 
1 Haute école de gestion de Genève, HEG-Genève, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western 
Switzerland, HES-SO, Geneva, Switzerland
2 Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 
Atlanta, USA
3 CESifo, Munich, Germany
4 Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and ESRC Centre 
for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
London, UK
5 SIAW-HSG and Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland
6 Laboratory of Environmental and Urban Economics (LEURE), Ecole polytechnique fédérale de 
Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
